EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
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EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
The Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_SchimmelfennigSchimmetfennigPaper prepared for EUSA Ninth Biennial International ConferenceAustin, 31 March - 2 April 2005Berthold RittbergerUniversity of Kaiserslautern 67663 Kaiserslautern. Germany -*■+49-631-205-2013 (phone) rittberg@rhrk.uni-kl.deFrank SchimmelfennigUniversity of Mannheim68131 Mannheim. Germa EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigny+-49-621-181-2813 (phone), -2845 (fax)frank.schimmelfennig@mzes.uni-mannheim.deAbstractParliamentarization and the institutionalization of human rigEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
hts are two processes of constitutionalization in the EU that constitute a puzzle for explanations inspired by both rationalist and constructivist insThe Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigity, values and norms that constitute the EU’s ethos strategically to put social and moral pressure on those community members that oppose the constitutionalization of the EƯ. Theoretically, this process will be most effective under conditions of high salience, legitimacy, publicity and resonance. I EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennign a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the EU’s constitutional decisions from 1951 to 2004, we show salience to be the by far most relevant conEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
dition of constitutionalization in the EU.1https://khothuvien.cori!IntroductionThe development of representative parliamentary institutions and the coThe Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigopments are, however, not solely restricted to the domain of the nation-state. In the European Union (EU), over the past half century, the European Parliament has undergone a remarkable transformation from an assembly endowed with supervisory powers to a directly-elected legislator, co-deciding most EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig secondary legislation on equal footing with the Council of Ministers. While human rights were not institutionalized in the founding Treaties of the EEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
uropean Communities, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) began to make references to fundamental rights in its jurisprudence since the late sixties (SThe Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Yet, the processes which underlie these two developments are fundamentally different to the ‘parliamentarization’ and institutionalization of human rights in nation-states. In the EƯ, these processes have not been triggered ‘from below’ by civic protest or EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigeven revolutionary movements, or as a result of the intervention of foreign powers.The phenomenon we refer to as ‘constitutionalization’ is the procesEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
s whereby the EU’s institutional architecture and legal order increasingly come to reflect the fundamental norms and principles of liberal democraciesThe Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigtitutionalization of human rights: Why and under what conditions have human rights become increasingly enshrined in the EU's legal architecture? Why has the European Parliament (EP) come to acquire powers2https://khothuvien.cori!over time that resemble those of national parliaments more than those o EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigf any parliamentary assembly of an international organization (Malamud and de Sousa 2004; Rittberger 2005: 2-3)?We will argue that for explanations inEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
spired by both rationalist and constructivist institutionalism these two phenomena constitute a puzzle which has not yet been resolved. To counter thiThe Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_SchimmelfennigAccording to this approach, community actors can use the liberal democratic identity, values and norms that constitute the EU’s ethos strategically to put social and moral pressure on those community members that oppose the constitutionalization of the EƯ. Theoretically, strategic action will be mos EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigt effective in a community environment if constitutional issues are highly salient, constitutional norms are possess high international legitimacy andEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
resonate well with domestic norms, and if constitutional negotiations are public. In a first attempt to test our argument empirically, we conduct a QThe Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigditions, they reveal salience to be the by far most relevant condition of constitutionalization in the EU.To develop our argument, we will proceed as follows. In the ensuing section, we will discuss the integration theoretic literature and illuminate why the state of the literature is unsatisfactoiy EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig with regard to the explanations and cues offered to shed light on the parliamentarization and the institutionalization of human rights. We then introEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
duce strategic action in a community environment as an alternative theoretical3https://khothuvien.cori!perspective. Section 4 describes our research dThe Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigoretical puzzleIntegration theorists have for long debated the causes of transfers of sovereignty from the domestic to the supranational level. The theory-oriented causal and empirical analysis of ‘constitutional’ negotiations and outcomes has been a stronghold of rationalist liberal intergovernment EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigalism which regards economic interdependence, commercial interests, bargaining power, and the institutionalization of state commitments to bargainingEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
outcomes as the central factors in the institutional development of the EU (Moravcsik 1998).2 Other rationalist studies on the delegation of competencThe Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig neglecting other aspects of constitutional politics - such as parliamentarization and the institutionalization of human rights. It has been demonstrated that these processes are difficult to explain on the basis of both rationalist intergovernmentalist as well as constructivist premises (Rittberger EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig 2005).Ỉ .1. Rationalism and constitutionalizationFrom a rationalist perspective, actors in constitutional politics seek to institutionalize competencEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
es and rules of decision-making which are most likely to maximize their utilities in future political bargains for which, however, the constellation oThe Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig collaborators in this project, Alexander Burgin and Guido Schwellnus, have contributed case study data to this paper.2The two constitutionalization phenomena have been well-described in the literature. For parliamentarization, see Coibett (1990), Maurer (2003); Westlake (1994): for the institutiona EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfenniglization of human rights, see Alston (1999): McCnidden (2001): Quinn (2001). Yet. as far as human rights are concerned, there is no theoretically-drivEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
en literature explaining institutionalization.4https://khothuvien.cori!preferences is uncertain. In order to determine what kind of rules maximize an The Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigplanations for institutional choices in the EU stress a number of functions exercised by institutions which induce political actors to delegate sovereignty. First, institutional choices can reduce the transaction costs associated with decision-making and thus carry efficiency-enhancing effects. For EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfenniginstance, slimming a legislative procedure by reducing the number of readings or, more drastically, reducing the number of veto players involved in deEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
cision-making may speed up decision-making or reduce the potential for stalemate or non-decision and hence reduce the costs of decision-making. HoweveThe Constitutionalization of the European Union: Explaining theParlianientarization and Institutionalization of Human RightsBerthold RittbergerFrank S EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig implications. Actors may challenge existing institutions not merely to improve the efficiency of decision-making but also to improve their capacity to affect policy decisions (Tsebelis 1990; Knight 1992). The second strand of literature thus looks at actors as policy-seekers, who prefer those insti EUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennigtutions which best help them to ’lock in’ their preferred ‘policy-streams’.In the EƯ literature, Hix (2002) has advanced a rationalist argument as toEUSA_Rittberger_&_Schimmelfennig
why the EU member states decided to reform the co-decision procedure at Amsterdam by scrapping the third reading, thereby improving its overall efficiGọi ngay
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