Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
➤ Gửi thông báo lỗi ⚠️ Báo cáo tài liệu vi phạmNội dung chi tiết: Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
to appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsf ReasonsA.w. CarusOne of the most enigmatic, but also most influential and captivating, aspects of Kant's overall project is his central concept of "reason" (Vernunft), which he contrasts with mere "understanding" (Verstand); the scope of reason, for him, is wider than the scope of knowledge, and e Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsmbraces the practical, ethical, and spiritual as well as the cognitive. Kant's treatment of this concept is perhaps the most systematic attempt in theSellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
history of modern philosophy to give substance to the intuition that science is not all there is to our human capacity for rational thought, that theto appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsds, but in the development and choice of ends themselves.1One standard way of viewing logical empiricism is to regard it as the denial of this intuition — the refusal to acknowledge anything in it worth explicating or preserving, and the "scientistic" arrogation of all cognitive authority to the sci Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsentific model of rationality (whatever that may turn out, in the end, to be). Wilfrid Sellars, on the other hand, is presently regarded as one of theSellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
first to challenge this narrow, supposedly logical empiricist, view of rationality. His famous paper "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", for instto appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons in turning analytic philosophy away from the foundationalist motives of the logical empiricists." (Rorty 1997, p. 5) And consequent on this abandonment of scientific "foundationalism", Sellars returns to something like a Kantian conception of "reason", as possessing a broader scope than1 This idea Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonshas repeatedly come to the fore within analytic philosophy over the past few decades, from a number of different viewpoints, but these have generallySellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
not taken account of each other. Some notable examples are Hilary Putnam's (1981) insistence that "reason can't be naturalized", Richard Velkley's (19to appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsf the unity of reason, Stephen Toulmin’s (2001) more popular attempt to revive a broader version of "reasonableness” against "scientific reason", and Michael Friedman's (2001) precisely opposite program of reconstructing a version of scientific reason as a broader concept. None of these authors was Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsmuch Influenced by Sellars, though certain more recent versions (Rorty, McDowell, Brandom) do show his Influence or acknowledge that they have followeSellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
d a similar path (Habermas 1999).— 2 —just scientific reason, and including the practical and ethical as well as the cognitive. Science, for Sellars, to appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsur deliberation about the ends we pursue. This broader rationality, in terms of which human beings came to self-awareness and which still provides the indispensable framework for our everyday Lebenswelt, Sellars called the "manifest image". He contrasted it with the "scientific image", the view of t Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonshe world (and the image of human life in the world) we find in scientific theory (Sellars 1962a).Sellars never arrived at a definitive formulation ofSellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
the precise relation between "manifest image" and "scientific image"; this was a problem he continued to address in different ways for the rest of histo appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons image. Our philosophical discourse, our categorial systems, our semantics and our pragmatics, have an inescapably evaluative component and are thus to be regarded as part of the manifest image, not themselves participant in the scientific image they aim to understand. In Sellars's own metaphor, the Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons philosopher attempts a "synoptic" or "stereoscopic" vision, in which manifest and scientific images are superimposed and brought into focus with eachSellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
other.2The backbone of this rational meta-discourse about our knowledge is, for Sellars, what he began by calling "pure pragmatics" (Sellars 1947a) ato appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsin the service of justification, verification, confirmation, truth, and meaning (Sellars 1947a, pp. 6-7). This is the category or "logical space" within the2 Almost any definite statement about the Import of these concepts in Sellars's thought is controversial; conflicting Interpretations are legion Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons, as the texts are notoriously obscure. I have tried to pursue a middle way, and to provide textual evidence for the parts of Sellars’s philosophy mosSellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
t relevant In the present context. But I am aware that others read these texts differently; I am grateful to William Rottschaefer for making me aware to appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonslars 1962) as my main text, and otherwise follow the interpretation that seems to me most internally consistent and most stalwartly middle-of-the-road, that of Triplett and deVries (2000), here esp. pp. 112-115.- 3 -manifest image, then, which Sellars calls the "logical space of reasons" in a celebr Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsated passage: ". . . in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state;Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what it says." (Sellars 1956, p. 169) It is this return to to appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsot only Rorty, but also McDowell, Brandom, and others base their broader-than-scientific conceptions of reason on the foundation laid by Sellars.It is not often recalled by his present followers, however, that Sellars developed his conception within the framework and vocabulary of logical empiricism Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons, specifically of Carnap. Of course this need not imply agreement; his broader conception of reason might have been a reaction against the perceived pSellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
rogram of the logical empiricists. What better foil and backdrop for articulating a broader, quasi-Kantian view of reason than the most extreme and unto appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsempiricism but largely of endorsement and agreement; his proposed amendments are framed as internal. In one of his early papers he even describes himself as having "deserted to the camp of logical empiricism" (Sellars 1947b, p. 31).It turns out that Sellars's expressed goals were not so different fr Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasonsom Carnap's. And Carnap’s conception of reason is not quite the narrowly "scientistic" one of popular prejudice; there is a Carnapian route to somethiSellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
ng recognizably like Sellars's "logical space of reasons", though it has a somewhat different status for Carnap than it did for Kant or Sellars. But tto appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons to Carnap was worse than a caricature. So the following is, to some unavoidable extent, an exercise in disentangling misunderstandings and setting the record straight. But this also offers an opportunity to articulate- 4 -Carnap's project from a point of view like that of Sellars, so that Sellars's Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons misunderstandings can in future be avoided.I. Material Rules of InferenceSellars began his career with a series of papers arguing that concepts belonSellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
ging to the "logical space of reasons" — like justification, confirmation, meaning, and truth (Sellars 1947a, pp. 6-7) — have an irreducibly normativeto appear in: s. Awodey and c. Klein, eds. Carnap Brought Home: The View from Jena (Chicago: Open Court 2003)Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons realms; its sentences are not reducible to logical or empirical ones. One confusing aspect of these early papers is that although they are explicitly positioned against what he calls "psychologism", he means something very different by this from Frege or Husserl. There is an overlap between what he Sellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons means and this previous meaning, but Sellars applies the term e.g. to truth-conditional accounts of meaning, which are not psychologistic in Frege’sSellars, Carnap, and the Logical Space of Reasons
sense; and Sellars does not apply the term, as we will see shortly, to the introduction of a "logical" connective defined only in terms of subjectiveGọi ngay
Chat zalo
Facebook