This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
➤ Gửi thông báo lỗi ⚠️ Báo cáo tài liệu vi phạmNội dung chi tiết: This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development, (3), pp. 380-405. doi:10.1057/jird.2012.10.The definitive version is available al:Iutp://\vw\v.palgrave-journals.com/jird/journal/vl6/n3/abs/jird201210a.html1Designing (he Financial Stability Board:A Theoretical Investigation of Mandate, Discretion, and MembershipManuela Moschella2IntroductionThe g This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,lobal financial crisis of 2007-09 has propelled a variety of international and national responses. Al the domestic level, authorities adopted policiesThis is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
primarily aimed at restoring financial market stability and avoiding spill-over effects to the real economy. At the international level, leaders and UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development, of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) certainly deserves special attention. Indeed, at their April 2009 summit in London, the G20 leaders announced the creation of the FSB to replace the Financial Stability Forum that had been created almost exactly ten years earlier in the aftermath of the 1997-1 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,998 East Asian financial crisis. Interestingly, as compared to its predecessor, the Financial Stability Board has been given ‘a broadened mandate to pThis is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
romote financial stability’, *a stronger institutional basis and enhanced capacity', and an ‘expanded’ membership, by including all G20 countries, FSFUNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,ard. Specifically, the paper investigates the factors that help explain some aspects of the new-institutional design of the FSB, namely its mandate, discretion, and membership. How can we account for the new functions delegated to the FSB. including that of assessing vulnerabilities affecting the gl This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,obal financial system and that of monitoring members' behavior? How can we account for the degree of discretion afforded to the FSB in the conduct ofThis is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
the assigned functions? Finally, how can we account for the size of the FSB's membership?3In answering these questions, the paper provides a conceptuaUNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,financial system - according to the oft-quoted remark of the US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, the FSB should be considered as the fourth pillar of global economic governance (US Treasury 2009). Indeed, while existing studies on the FSB have explored important empirical issues on the workings This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,of the new body, focusing on policy implications in terms of efficiency and legitimacy (see, for instance, Helleiner 2010a, 2010b; Griffith-Jones er aThis is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
l. 2010a), studies on the FSB’s creation have yet to investigated the issue with reference to theories of international organizations. In order to filUNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development, IOs - i.e. principal-agent (PA) theory - can help explain the functions, discretion, and membership of the FSB and by discussing alternative theoretical explanations.Specifically, PA models predict that principals delegate powers and discretion to an agent in order to reduce the transaction costs r This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,elated to the specific issue area in which the agent operates (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Moe 1984). The transaction cosThis is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
ts associated with international financial cooperation that aims to minimize the probability of financial crises include costs of information collectiUNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,ick and coordinated decision-making procedures in the event of global crises also adds to the list of transaction costs that principals aim to minimize with the creation of international agents. Building on these insights, we would expect that the institutional design of the FSB reflects principals’ This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development, conscious attempt to reduce the transaction costs of financial cooperation to facilitate the collection of policy-relevant4https://khothuvien.cori!inThis is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
formation, ensure compliance, and expedite the decision-making process. We should also expect that decisions related to the optimum size of the memberUNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,om the application of PA theory to processes of delegation is that principals have few incentives to delegate should conflicting preferences among principals exist. Given conflict, the probability to strike a compromise among members decreases as does the capacity to make rapid decisions (Epstein an This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,d O’Halloran 1996; 1999; McCubbins and Page 1987).In order to test these propositions, this paper reviews the institutional characteristics of the FSBThis is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
assessing the extent to which they are explicable in light of the hypotheses developed in principal-agent studies. As will be shown, empirical evidenUNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,ue area of financial cooperation. In particular, it seems that the new functions reflect G20 Leaders’ demand for policy-relevant information, and credible commitment. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence also signals anomalous results with regards to the degree of discretion and the size of the memb This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,ership. Given principals’ pressing demand for expertise and credible commitment, the discretion granted to the FSB seems more limited than the theoretThis is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
ical model would lead US to expect. Indeed, the autonomy of the FSB is constrained by its functions because of the limited size of its staff, the ambiUNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development, members. Finally, the size of the FSB’s membership provides the biggest anomaly for PA theory. Indeed, given PA theory's expectation of homogeneity of preferences among principals, it becomes difficult to reconcile the decision to increase heterogeneity by expanding the number of members. In short, This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development, the5application of PA theory to the study of the FSB’s design presents serious anomalies suggesting the need to expand the theorization of the FSB’sThis is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
creation exploring alternative theoretical explanations. In doing so. it will be possible to provide a theoretical underpinning to the study of the FSUNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,e can question the validity of the applying of PA models to the analysis of the FSB, as this international body does not perfectly fit with the commonly accepted definition of delegation in the literature. Indeed, the common definition of delegation indicates the transfer of authoritative powers by This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,a group of principals to a third-party agent. In other words, in most PA studies in international relations, delegation takes place from a group of stThis is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
ates to an international organization, a secretariat, court, or any other third party. According to some observers, however, the FSB barely fits givenUNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,t goes, it is still primarily a coordinating body among national authorities as was its predecessor (i.e. the Financial Stability Forum - FSF) (on this point see. for instance, Griffith Jones el al. 2010b; and Schinasi and Truman 2010: 3).Although the FSB is not strictly an agent in the language of This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,the literature, a core claim of the article is that PA models can nonetheless be applied to the study of the FSB. Indeed, although the FSB was not estThis is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,
ablished by a formal international agreement ratified by governments, as is the case for most international organizations, the FSB was deliberately crUNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STƯDI DI TORINOThis is an author version of the contribution published on:Journal of international Relations and Development,2013,16 This is an author version of the contribution published on Journal of International Relations and Development,a structure that is separate from that of its members. Of6Gọi ngay
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