Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
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Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
LETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed al to human social behaviour1 However, choosing to cooperate requires individuals to incur a personal cost to benefit others. Here we explore the cognitive basis of cooperative decision-making in humans using a dual-proccss framework1*’1*. We ask whether people arc predisposed towards selfishness, b Spontaneous giving and calculated greed ehaving cooperatively only through active self-control; or whether they are intuitively cooperative, with reflection and prospective reasoning favouriSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
ng 'rational’ self-interest. To investigate this issue, we perform ten studies using economic games. We find that across a range of experimental desigLETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed eas instniơing them to reflect and forcing them to decide slowly decreases contributions. Finally, an induction that primes subjects to trust their intuitions increases contributions compared with an induction that promotes greater reflection. To explain these results, we propose that cooperation is Spontaneous giving and calculated greed intuitive because ctMi|»eralive heuristics are developed in daily life wliere cooperation is typically advantageous. We liven validate predictions geSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
nerated by this proposed mechanism. Our results provide convergent evidence that intuition supports cooperation in social dilemmas, and that reflectioLETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed sms underlying this cooperative behaviour. We use a dual-process framework in which intuition and reflection interact to produce decisions1^151*. Intuition is often associated with parallel processing, automaticity, effortlessness, lack ofinsight into the dec ision process and emotional influence. R Spontaneous giving and calculated greed eflection is often associated with serial processing, eflbrlfulness and the rejection of emotional influence1" r' . ĨII addition, one of the psychologSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
ical features most widely used to distinguish intuition from reflection is processing speed: intuitive responses are relatively fast, whereas reflectiLETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed stinction between automatic and controlled processing1*'17.Viewing cooperation from a dual-process perspective raises the following questions: are we intuitively self-interested, and is it only-through reflection that we reject our selfish impulses and force ourselves to cooperate? Or arc we intuiti Spontaneous giving and calculated greed vely cooperative, with reflection upon the logic of self interest causing US Io rein in our cxsoperative urges and instead act selfishly? Or, alternatSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
ively, is there no cognitive conflict between intuition and reflection? Here we address these questions using economic cooperation games.We Iregin by LETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed pulses, predicts that faster decisions will Ik- less cooperative. Conversely, the hypothesis that intuition preferentially supports prosocial behaviour, whereas reflection leads to increased selfishness, predicts that faster decisions will be more cooperative.As a first test of these competing hypot Spontaneous giving and calculated greed heses, wc- conducted a one-shot public goods game1" (PGG) with groups of four participants.We recruited 212 subjects from around the world using the oSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
nline labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)1*. AMT provides a reliable subject pool that is more diverse than a typical sample of college undergrLETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed much to contribute to a common pool. Any money contributed was doubled and split evenly among the four group members (see Supplementary Information, section 3, for experimental details).Figure la shows the fraction of the endowment contributed in the slower half of decisions compared to the faster h Spontaneous giving and calculated greed alf. Faster decisions result in substantially higher contributions compared with slower decisions (rank sum test, p= 0.007). Furthermore, as shown inSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
Fig. lb, we sec a consistent decrease in contribution amount withb 100%-.10%4-----------1----------,---------.----------1-------------o.z 0.61t.4»422DLETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed n — 212). this Miggcsts that the intuitive retponw is to be cooperative- a. Using a median split on decision time, we compare the contribution levels of the faster half versus slower half of decisions. Hu.- average- contribution is substantially higlx-r for the faster decisions, b. Plotting contribu Spontaneous giving and calculated greed tion as a function of login-trunsfomwd decision lime shows a negative relationship between decision time and contribution. Dot size is proportional toSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
the number of observations, listed next to each dot. Error bars, mean ± sx.m. (see Supplementary Information, sections 2 and 3. for statistical analyLETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed bndgc.Mass3:rMXttsO213S.USA. •'Dscu rtmentot PsjetKtosy. YíSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
time (Tobit regression, coefficient =-15.84, p = 0.019; see Supplementary Information, sections 2 and 3. for statistical details). These findings sugLETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed ision time data were recorded In these studies, conducted in the physical laboratory with college students, the experimental software automatically recorded decision times, but these data had not been previously analysed. To examine the psychology that subjects bring with them into the laboratory, w Spontaneous giving and calculated greed e focused on play in the first round of each experimental session. In a one-shot prisoner's dilemma (n 48)”. a lepeated prisoner's dilemma with executSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
ion errors (n = 278)’'. a repeated prisoner's dilemma with and without costly punishment (n - I IM)22, and a repeated PGG with and without reward and/LETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed details). These results show the robustness of our decision-time findings: across a range of experimental designs, and with students in the physical laboratory as well as with an international online sample, faster decisions arc associated with more prosociality.We now demonstrate the causal link be Spontaneous giving and calculated greed tween intuition and coop cration suggested by these correlational studies. To do so, we recruited another 680 subjects on AM T and experimentally maniSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
pulated their decision times in the same one-shot PGG used above. In the ‘time pressure’ condition, subjects were forced to reach their decision quickLETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed intuitive. In the 'time delay* condition, subjects were instructed to carefully consider their decision and forced to wait for at least Ills before chousing a contribution amount. Tillis, in this condition, rln.isiiiiis are expected Io l>e driven more by lefleclion (see Supplementary Information, se Spontaneous giving and calculated greed ction 5, fur experimental details).The results (Fig. 2a) arc consistent with the correlational observations in Fig 1. Subjects in the time-pressure coSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
ndition contribute significantly more money on average than subjects in the time-delay condition (rank sum. p< 0.001). Moreover, we find that both manLETTERdoi:10.103a/naturell467Spontaneous giving and calculated greedDavid G. Rand1' 5, Joshua D. Greener* & Martin A. Nowak1-4-5*Cooperation is centra Spontaneous giving and calculated greed -ssure contribute more than unconstrained subjn.ls (rank sum. I’ (1.058). whereas subjects who are insliiMled 111 reileil and delay their decision contribute less than unconstrained subjects (rank sum. p 0.028), although the former difference is only marginally significant. See Supplementary Informa Spontaneous giving and calculated greed tion, section 5. for regression analyses.Additionally, we recruited 211 Boston area college students and replicated our time constraint experiment inSpontaneous giving and calculated greed
the physical lalxiratory with tenfold higher stakes (Fig. 2b). We find again that subjects in the lime pressure condition contribute significantly morGọi ngay
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