Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
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Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
https://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralitye on the diachronic will and the problem of moralityAlessandra TanesiniAbstract: In this paper I offer an innovative interpretation of Nietzsche’s metaethical theory of value which shows him to be a kind of constitutivist. For Nietzsche, I argue, valuing is a conative attitude which institutes value Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralitys, rather than tracking what is independently of value. What is characteristic of those acts of willing which institute values is that they are ownedNietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
or authored. Nietzsche makes this point using (he vocabulary of self-mastery. One crucial feature of those who have achieved this feat, and have consehttps://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality possession of a will of this sort is crucial because it is a necessary condition for engaging in temporally unified activities which are a requisite of authorship. Nietzsche, 1 argue, makes these points in his doctrine of eternal recurrence which provides a test that acts of will must pass to count Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality as laws. In the final section of the paper I argue for (he superiority of this interpretation over some of its competitors.Introduction. There seemsNietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
to be a contradiction, or at the least a tension, at the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy of value. On the one hand, he urges the undertaking of a new https://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralityther hand, he writes that: 'there are altogether no moral facts’ and that ‘(mjoral judgments agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are no realities’ (Tl.vii.l).These two claims do not easily sit side by side. The project of critiquing or reevaluating moral values requires that on Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralitye questions whether what is posited as having value from a moral point of view (e.g., compassion and self-sacrifice) is actually of1https://khothuvienNietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
.cori!value (GM. Preface. 5). Hence, this project makes sense only if we can distinguish between two kinds of claim about values. The first kind concehttps://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralitymunity-posited values. In turn this distinction could be taken to be predicated on keeping separate two notions of value: values in a descriptive sense as that which is thought to be of value by an individual or by the members of a group, and values in a normative sense as that which is objectively Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralityof value.1 However, if Nietzsche is also committed to denying the existence of any moral facts, it would seem impossible to attribute to him a commitmNietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
ent to the existence of any values in the normative sense.The apparent tension between these claims has been the subject of critical controversy and ghttps://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralityvalues such as moral values. These are facts about a naturalistic property (power) which functions as the external standard by which all attributions of value to any thing, goal or property are to be assessed (1983: 349)? More specifically, Nietzsche would ground his claims about what is to count as Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality human perfection and therefore be of genuine moral value in empirical assertions about human nature, conceived as a striving for increasing amounts oNietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
f power? At the opposite hand of this spectrum, Leiter (2000 and 2010) has argued instead that Nietzsche proposes his re-valuation of values as a stathttps://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralityvalue in a normative sense. Instead, value is reduced to what is valued from some perspective or other, whilst there are no normative means by which to adjudicate between perspectives (Cf. BGE 108).2https://khothuvien.cori!Neither of the options mentioned is appealing. Nietzsche’s commitment to the Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralityclaim that non-prudential values are dependent upon the attitude of valuing is beyond dispute. It finds frequent expression in his published work (cf.Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
HA 4; GS 301; BGE 108). Al the same lime, it is rather implausible that Nietzsche takes the values he urges on his readers to be normatively on a parhttps://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralityd ‘(he conscience for the collective evolution of mankind’ (BGE 61). It would also be hard to see why Nietzsche would describe the task as one of ranking values according to their value, if such a ranking were merely the expression of a personal preference (GM.i.17; BGE 212; EH.BT.2).'The assumption Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality that moral objectivity requires realism about moral facts is a common feature of these two interpretations. The first treats statements about valuesNietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
as statements about power. It thus attributes to Nietzsche a commitment to objectivity because it reads him as a realist, and a reductive naturalist, https://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralityo him some form of anti-realism about all values, thus concluding that he must have denied any objectivity to morality. Hence, both positions assume that all moral claims purport to describe pre-existing moral facts. They assume that Nietzsche is a cognilivist about moral discourse. This is the view Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality that moral claims express beliefs and are to be assessed for their truth or falsity. Therefore, if there are no moral facts, all moral claims must beNietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
false. No one such claim can be epistemically privileged over any others. Alternatively, one may hold that some moral claims are correct because theyhttps://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralityinterpretation of Nietzsche’s metaethical theory of value. For Nietzsche, I argue, valuing is a conative attitude. It is a matter of willing rather than judging. Further, in his view what is of value (what is desirable) is what is valued (or desired) by acts which are genuinely evaluative.6 More spe Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralitycifically the attitude of valuing is constitutive of the values, rather than tracking what is independently of value. So values are the product of evaNietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
luative attitudes; they are not discovered but created. Nevertheless, values can be objectively ranked. It is only those purported values which are brhttps://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality are the objects of acts that are not truly evaluative. If this is Nietzsche’s view, as I think it is, one of the main planks of its defence will be an account of what makes an act genuinely evaluative which does not presuppose that what it evaluates has value independently of its evaluation.This in Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralityterpretation of Nietzsche on evaluation should not be confused with an account of value in terms of fitting evaluation. A popular contemporary versionNietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
of this latter approach accounts for what is of value (desired) in terms of what one has reasons to value (desire) (provided that the reasons are of https://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality (2007) attribute to Nietzsche himself, although they do not characterise it in these words. In their view, this ‘fitting attitudes' account of values is supplemented in Nietzsche with a non-cognitivist account of reasons, according to which to claim that one has a reason to q> is to express one's a Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralitycceptance of a system of norms that permitsNietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
n anti-realist about value and an objectivise about moral discourse.4Despite their insight into Nietzsche’s theory of value, Clark and Dudrick are, inhttps://khothuvien.cori!Forthcoming in (he European Journal of Philosophy, please quote from the published version once it becomes available.Nietzsche Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralitytzsche thinks of value as what is desired or willed in an act which is authored or owned.8 Further, only beings endowed with a special kind of psychological make-up are capable of authoring or owning their will. This is the make-up characteristic of the great soul, who alone is capable of solving th Nietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of moralitye supreme problems (BGE 213). More specifically, what is characteristic of these individuals is that they possess self-mastery because they have develNietzsche on the diachronic will and the problem of morality
oped a diachronic will. Nietzsche refers to the diachronic will -the ability to govern rationally future behaviour- as the ’long will’ which is the prGọi ngay
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