The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
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The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
Brexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprilcision by (he United Kingdom (UK) to withdraw from the European Union (EU) has reignited tensions around the clearing of euro-denominated derivatives. Yet, the EU has resisted concerted pressure from several member states and the ECB to force (he relocation of euro clearing away from London. Instead The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April, it has opted to strengthen the supervision of EU and non-EU Central Counterparties (CCPs), leaving the derecognition of third country CCPs as a lastThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
resort. How do we explain this? Drawing on theories of comparative and international political economy, we argue that while a state-centric perspectiBrexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprill institutions. In addition, a transnational approach has limited explanatory power because a large cross-border financial coalition failed to mobilise around the issue. Instead, we argue that significant analytical leverage can be added by incorporating a bureaucratic politics perspective. This rev The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprileals that the EU’s resistance to a location policy reflected the need to reconcile the competing bureaucratic interests of different supranational insThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
titutions. The article suggests that a better understanding of bureaucratic power and preferences can provide a more holistic explanation of EU financBrexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprilaring of euro-denominated instruments - principally derivatives - which emerged at the height of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. Clearing is the process by which a ‘clearing house’, also called a ‘central counter party’ (CCP). acts as the middleman for both the buyer and the seller of a The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprilfinancial instrument. Clearing is important for financial stability given the huge volume of trades in derivatives and securities that are conducted dThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
aily. But it is also a lucrative financial activity for those financial centres capable of attracting this business. Given that the bulk of euro-denomBrexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprilerivatives markets worldwide.Al the height of the euro area sovereign debt crisis in July 2011, the ECB issued a policy paper calling for CCPs that cleared a significant proportion of euro-denominated financial instruments to be located in the euro area (ECB 2011). The proposal was strongly opposed The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprilby UK policy-makers, keen to retain the profitable euro clearing business in the City of London. Although the UK government successfully challenged thThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
e ECB’s plans in the European Court of Justice (ECJ), efforts to revive the so-called ‘location policy’ for euro clearing gathered pace following the Brexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 AprilUK would not be able to retain its key role in clearing euro denominated instruments (Bloomberg, 29 June 2016). Andreas Dombret (2017), a member of the Executive Board of the German Bundesbank, argued in favour of ‘having the bulk of the clearing business inside the euro2https://khothuvien.cori!area The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April’. In the UK, the former member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, Charles Bean (2016), in his evidence before parliament notedThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
that ‘As far as euro clearing in concerned, I will not say it is likely that we [the UK) will lose it: I will say it is certain that we will lose it..Brexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April of euro clearing. The legislative proposal put forward by the European Commission in June 2017, and agreed by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament in March 2019, did not seek to reinstate an automatic relocation requirement for CCPs conducting euro clearing above a certain threshold The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April, as originally envisaged by the ECB. Instead, the revised European Market Infrastructure Regulation (known as EMIR II) called for the strengthened suThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
pervision of both EU and non-EU CCPs through the creation of a new supervisory' mechanism within the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).Brexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprilly important’ CCPs would be subject to stricter regulatory requirements and strengthened EU-level supervision. Importantly, if the requirements were insufficient to mitigate the potential risks, then CCPs deemed ‘substantially systemically important’ could be derecognised and only authorised to prov The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprilide services to EƯ customers if they were (re)located in the EU.1 However, important safeguards were inserted so that derecognition of a third countryThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
CCP would only happen as a ‘last resort’, and should in practice never be needed (interviews, London, Brussels, September 2018).The EU’S resistance tBrexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprilpirically and3theoretically. Euro clearing has significant implications for financial stability across the EU, and the effectiveness of monetary policy within the euro area. It is also an important source of tax revenue and employment for those financial jurisdictions in which a large volume of trad The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Apriles are cleared. We would therefore expect the main EU authorities (particularly, the Commission, the ECB, and ESMA) to push strongly for the relocatioThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
n of euro clearing to the EU after Brexit. Furthermore, state-centric approaches (Donnelly 2014; Drezner 2007; Knaack 2015; Helleiner 2014; Posner 200Brexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprill 2018; Macartney 2010), or historical institutionalism (Bothe and Mattli 2011; Posner 2009b; Thiemann 2014, 2018), would predict that member states with large financial centres (notably, France, Germany and Italy), together with their established CCPs, stood to gain considerably from greater third The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprilcountry restrictions. We would therefore expect them to seek to exploit the window of opportunity provided by Brexit in order to ‘repatriate’ euro cleThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
aring. How. then, can we explain the new EU legislation on euro clearing?We apply mainstream theoretical approaches in international and comparative pBrexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprilncerted push by the French and German policymakers, and their respective financial centres, to adopt euro clearing restrictions. They also account for why UK and the US policy-makers, allied with their national financial industries, sought to resist euro clearing restrictions. In practice, however, The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 AprilUS and UK regulators had divergent preferences on crucial aspects of CCP regulation, and their efforts to lobby against the changes proved largely ineThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
ffective. State-centric approaches, therefore, struggle to explain why the EU resisted Franco-German pressure to force the relocation of euro clearingBrexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April2018), mutual interests (Cerny 2010; McKeen-Edwards and Porter 2013; Milgge 2010; Porter 2014; cf Young 2012) or shared norms (Tsingou 2015; Seabrooke and Wigan 2016) also have limited explanatory power. We find that the mobilisation of transnational coalitions around euro clearing was surprisingly The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprillimited. In fact, the EU financial industry was deeply divided and weakly organised on the issue; although opposition came from a number of large FrenThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
ch and German banks responsible for the bulk of trading in derivatives (the so-called ‘dealer banks’), EU-based CCPs (notably, those in France, GermanBrexit and the political economy of euro-denominated clearingScott Janies (King’s College London) Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)AbstractThe dec The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Apriltional accounts provide only a partial - and potentially misleading -explanation of the EU’s position on euro clearing.This paper argues that in order to explain the EU’s policy on euro clearing it is necessary to incorporate theories of bureaucratic politics, which emphasise the agency of supranati The Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 Aprilonal institutions, and the competition for resources between them (Bach et al. 2016; Busuioc 2016; Carpenter 2001; Egeberg and Trondal 2011; Trondal eThe Political Economy of Euro Clearing 29 April
t al 2013). We argue that the EU’s cautious approach was shaped by bureaucratic competition and rivalry between the Commission, the ECB and ESMA, as wGọi ngay
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