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Decentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.as at Austin Alberto Vergara, Universite de MontrealBeginning in the eighties, decentralization reforms swept Latin America.Hundreds or even thousands of sub-national authorities with fiscal autonomy were now elected by popular vote. The creation of these new institutions attracted considerable acad dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.emic attention. Scholars first explored the causes of decentralization reforms in the region (Willis et al 1999; Grindle 2000; Garman et al 2001; Montdargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.
ero and Samuels 2004; O'Neill 2005). Later, they turned to analyzing the effects of these reforms on diverse political phenomena; among others: democrDecentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.nments (Fallen 2010); the emergence of sub-national authoritarian enclaves (Gibson 2005); or the impact of decentralization reforms on political parties (Harbers 2010).In this paper we focus on this last literature. Some scholars have argued that decentralization reforms had unintended negative effe dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.cts on national political parties in Latin America. A recent study comparing the effects of decentralization in sixteen Latin American countries, fordargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.
example, concludes that there is a trade-off between a decentralized political system and a national party system (Harbers 2010). Similarly, Sabatini Decentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.olivia and Peru.15 See also Penfold 2004; Bracanti 2008; Centellas 2009.1These and other authors propose that, in one way or another, “decentralization conspires against party aggregation” (Leiras 2006).We explore the soundness of this alleged negative relationship by examining (he cases of Bolivia. dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics. Colombia and Peru, three countries that adopted similar decentralization reforms in the last decades in two waves. First, the three countries went thdargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.
rough a process of municipalization, the creation of hundreds (more than a thousand in Colombia and Peru) of considerably autonomous local governmentsDecentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.as the basis for regional governments at the meso level (Bolivia in 2004, Colombia in 1991 and Peru in 2002) (Table 1). Although all these countries suffered the weakening of their traditional party systems after decentralization, once we look at the sub-national level we find some interesting contr dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.asts among the cases that will allow US to clarify the hypothesized negative relation between decentralization and political parlies.Table 1 Decentraldargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.
ization reforms in Bolivia. Colombia and Peru.DECENTRALIZATION REFORMSBOLIVIACOLOMBIAPERUTOWARDS LOCAL LEVEL 80S-90SYear of creation19941986198O2NumbeDecentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.lectedMayorMayorMayor' Municipalization in Peru was adopted in the sixties. Nonetheless, after two elections, a military coup eliminated all elections until the return of democracy to the country in 1980.2TOWARDS MESO LEVEL 90S-2000SYear of creation200419912002Number of decentralized units created9 dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.departments, became 9 regions32 departments first, then 3625 departments, became 25 regional governmentsName of the authority electedPrefect first, afdargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.
terwards GovernorsGovernorsRegional presidentDoes the “decentralization against parties" hypothesis hold in these cases? Does decentralization explainDecentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.in conditions and —deviating from the hypothesis— can even contribute to strengthening parties? By drastically changing the Riles of political competition and the distribution of resources in countries where these resources are scarce, decentralization reforms would appear likely candidates for inst dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.itutions capable of “Riling" politics. Are these reforms meaningful independent sources of political change?Our findings precise the conditions underdargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.
which decentralization affects negatively political parties and those instances in which it is irrelevant or may even contribute to party aggregation,Decentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.s and relied heavily on clicntelism to maintain their dominance. The Bolivian case runs contrary Io the hypothesis by showing that if ideational or programmatic cleavages arc present in the country, decentralization is not a substantial barrier for the emergence of strong political parties such as M dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.ovimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party. The Peruvian case, on its turn, shows that decentralization was of3secondary importance for traditional parties’dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.
collapse and confirms that current party weakness is rooted in deeper causes than decentralization. Our main conclusion is that deeper causes, and notDecentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.e first section we provide an overview of the causal mechanisms identified in the literature that suggests a negative relationship between decentralization and political parties. We also describe the changes over time in party strength in the three countries and explain why a proper assessment of th dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.e effects of decentralization on parties requires evaluating party performance in local and regional elections. Next we discuss our three cases. Eachdargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.
case offers relevant information to assess the overall soundness of the “decentralization against parties" hypothesis. We conclude by discussing our fDecentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.TRENGTHMany authors propose that decentralization reforms can have negative effects on political parties. These authors stress the negative impact of decentralization on party system nationalization (Harbers 2010); party system institutionalization (Datgent and Mufioz 2011); party system structure ( dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.Morgan forthcoming): party aggregation (Leiras 2006); and party strength (Sabatini 2003). Although their dependent variables are conceptualized slightdargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.
ly differently, all these authors coincide that decentralization reforms can negatively affect party strength, a term broad enough to encompass the4prDecentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.rty is able to attract competitive politicians on all levels and assure their loyalty over time. Conversely, party weakness means low continuity and the proliferation of independent politicians at all levels of government who change parties from election to election.In this literature we identify th dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.ree causal mechanisms linking decentralization and party weakness. The first two mechanisms are two sides of the same coin; they highlight how decentrdargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.
alization reforms shrink the resource asymmetry (opportunities for patronage) between party leaders and local politicians, reducing the patronage inceDecentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.change in voters increases the incentives for local candidates to run independent campaigns.a)Decentralization undermines the higher echelons of the party system by weakening party leaders’ access to and control of patronage resources (funds, bureaucratic positions, campaign goods, etc.) and, at the dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics. same time, enhancing the demand for these resources by local politicians (Morgan forthcoming, Chapter 7). After decentralization, parties have to disdargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.
tribute their limited pool of resources in hundreds, or even thousands, of campaigns. Party elites also lose the possibility of appointing local politDecentralization Against Parties?The Effects of Decentralization on Political Parties in Bolivia, Colombia and PeruEduardo Dargent, University of Texa dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.an forthcoming). These rewards are key incentives that serve to maintain party structure and discipline, as they make party careers attractive to3 Although, as discussed In (he conclusion, some of them stress that (his relation only holds under certain conditions.5 dargentvergara_paper_ruling_politics.Gọi ngay
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