Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
➤ Gửi thông báo lỗi ⚠️ Báo cáo tài liệu vi phạmNội dung chi tiết: Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
RUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts rd UniversityTamar SaguyYale UniversityJames SidamusHarvard UniversityDonald M. TaylorMcGill University(IN PRESS AT THE JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY)RUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWERThere are all (00 many historical examples of how intergroup conflicts can have devastating effects on th Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts e groups, communities, and societies they involve. From Rwanda to Sarajevo to Gaza, violent intergroup conflict has wrought untold material damage andNegotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
ravaged millions of lives. While typically less striking, conflict between groups in professional settings (e.g., between Management and a Labor UnioRUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts xact severe costs on the parties involved Given the high cost of intergroup conflict, understanding the factors that influence the possibility of arriving at negotiated resolutions between clashing sides has been of major interest to both conflict resolution theorists (Bar-Tai. 2000: Kehnan. 1987: R Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts ouhana & Korper, 1996) and negotiation researchers (Bazerman. Cui han. Moore. & Valley, 2000; De Dreu. Beeisma. Steinel, & Van Kleef. 2007; Rubin & BrNegotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
own. 1975). Such interest IS not only academic: persistent intergroup conflicts often elicit stiong calls from third parties (eg.. the international cRUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts raeli-Palestinian conflictIn spite of the attention that negotiations have received as an avenue for resolving conflict, both between individuals (Bazerman et al.. 2000; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992) and groups (Kelman. 1987: Loschelder & Trotschel. 2010). there has been very little consideration of a c Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts ritical stage in the negotiation process: the willingness to actually accept an offer to negotiate The vast majority of negotiations research assumesNegotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
that two sides are already at the negotiating table (Bear. 2011). and subsequently investigates a number of factors — such as the power asymmetry betwRUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts motivational orientations (De Dietl. Beersma. Stroebe. & Euwema. 2006) — that influence the probability and quality of a resolution. If. however, one (or both) of the two sides 111 a conflict expresses no willingness to enter into negotiations with ItsRUNNING HEAD: NEGOTIATING POWERcounterpart. thes Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts e other factors will matter very little. This issue of willingness to negotiate has much real-world importance: at the tune of wilting. for example, nNegotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
egotiations between Israel and the Palestinians are at a standstill, with the Palestinian leadership expressing no willingness to negotiate with IsraeRUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts imary variable of interest in the cun ent research was the willingness (or lack thereof) of conflicting sides to enter negotiations with one another: a crucial, yet understudied, part of the pre-negotiations phaseA central proposition in our research is that group power, and associated orientations Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts towards changes to the status quo. influence the types of negotiations that high and low power group members are willing to enter Although the extentNegotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
to which this is the case can vary as a function of contextspecific features of the proposed discussions, negotiations typically imply at least some pRUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts ective on changes to the status quo needs to be taken into accoiuit when considering the willingness to enter a given set of negotiations. An important construct shaping these orientations is group power, traditionally defined as relative control of resources and decreased dependence on the other si Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts de (Bacharach & Lawler. 1981; Emerson. 1962; Thibaut & Kelley. 1959). In a highly asymmetric conflict, where the high power group controls the majoritNegotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
y of resources, changes to the existing intergroup structure are likely to involve the low powered group gaining possession of some valuable assets (eRUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts their relatively disadvantaged position (LeVine & Campbell. 1972; Taj f el & Turner. 1979: Sidanius & Pratto. 1999). low power group members are likely to welcome such changes. As such, they should prefer negotiations that seem to involve a greater possibility of revisions to the status quo. Althou Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts gh the high power gloup can also derive benefits from negotiating (such as quelling dissent), the possibilityRUNNING HEAD: NEGOTIATING POWERof changesNegotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
to their advantaged situation— and the potential loss of resources involved— is likely to induce some feelings ofthreat (Bkuner, 1958; Bobo. 1983; ShRUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts uld promote a preference for negotiations that seem to minimize the scope of modifications to the existing order (Bobo. 1999; Okhuysen. Galinsky. & uptigrove. 2003; Rouhana. 2001; Taylor. 1991). We therefore propose that low power gloup members will favor negotiations that seem to imply greater— as Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts compared to lesser— potential for changes to the status quo. whereas high power group members will favor negotiations that seem to involve less potentNegotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
ial for change.Several features of the negotiating process can provide clues to then potential status-quo consequentiality. For example, a given side RUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts existing situation in upcoming negotiations. Similarly, the presence of a third party demanding changes, or the existence of a strict timetable, are all factors that might influence perceptions of the likely status-quo consequentiality of negotiations. In the present work, we focused on another impo Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts rtant facet of negotiations that can also contain cues about then status-quo consequentiality: the negotiating agenda The negotiating agenda has beenNegotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
recognized as a critical aspect of the negotiating process, oftentimes figuring prominently 111 pre-negotiation discussions, and holding the potentialRUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts negotiations, such as the involvement of third parties, which may be relevant in some contexts but not others, the negotiating agenda is relevant across the vast majority of negotiations. Indeed, the agenda addresses crucial practical matters, specifying which issues will be discussed between the t Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts wo sides, as well as the maimer in which discussion of theissues will proceed (Busch & Horstmaiui. 2002; Malhotra & Bazemian. 2007; Pendergast. 1990).Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
RUNNING HEAD: NEGOTIATING POWERImportantly, and especially relevant to Olli cunent focus, the issues to be resolved between two sides can vary- in theRUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts n have a substantial influence on the power dynamic lietween parties involved in the conflict. Such issues are typically related to high-value resources at the heart of the power differential between the two sides1.1 or example, in rhe context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, decisions regarding Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts rhe borders of a Palestinian stale arc likely to have a greater effect on die balance of power between die two sides than any agreements about the deNegotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
tails of water distribution, similarly. in the context of a divorce settlement, negotiations over rhe ownership of a home are more likely to impact thRUNNING HEAD NEGOTIATING POWER1Negotiating Power: Agenda ordering and the Willingness to Negotiate in Asymmetric Intergroup ConflictsNour KteilyHarvar Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts th respect to forming a negotiating agenda is the order in which to address the different issues (Flaniiru. 2007; Malhotra & Bazerman. 2007). One approach IS to address various disputed issues simultaneously in Older to maximize the possibility of mutually beneficial (i.e.. integrative) trades acros Negotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts s each issue (Busch & Horstmann. 1997: Inderst. 2000). Nevertheless, human cognitive limitations make sequential bargaining— where negotiators addressNegotiating power agenda ordering and the willingness to negotiate in asymmetric intergroup conflicts
the various issues in some sequence a more realistic possibility, and such bargaining tends to be the norm in practice (De D1CU cl al.. 2009:1 lainimGọi ngay
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