Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy
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Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy
Mandy SimonsCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy2000 Forbes Ave Pittsburgh PA 15217 USAphone: 412.268.5083 fax: 412.268.1440simonst&an Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophyndrew.cmu.edu July 29, 20092103. Implicature1Introduction2The Gricean conception of conversational implicature3A case study: scalar implicature4Embedded implicature5Alternate models and competing conceptions6Formal approachesThis article reviews in detail Grice's conception of conversational implica Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophyture. then surveys the major literature on scalar im pl feature from early work to the present. Embedded implicature is illustrated, and it is explainCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy
ed why this phenomenon poses a challenge to the Gricean view. Some alternate views of conversational implicature are then presented. The article conclMandy SimonsCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy2000 Forbes Ave Pittsburgh PA 15217 USAphone: 412.268.5083 fax: 412.268.1440simonst&an Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophysays one thing and thereby conveys (typically, in addition) something else. For example, in (1) below, Harold says that Sally should bring her umbrella, but further conveys that (he believes that) it is likely to rain. This is a standard case of the phenomenon under examination.(1) Sally: What’s the Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy weather going to be like today?Harold: You should bring your umbrella.Conversational implicature was identified and named by the philosopher Paul GriCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy
ce in his paper Logic and Conversation, originally presented at Harvard in 1969. Much of today's linguistic pragmatics has its origins in the insightsMandy SimonsCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy2000 Forbes Ave Pittsburgh PA 15217 USAphone: 412.268.5083 fax: 412.268.1440simonst&an Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophyture32.1.Implicature as part of what is meantFor Grice, what a speaker means by an utterance is the total content which she thereby intends to communicate (see also article 2 Meaning, Intentionality and Communication and article 5 Meaning in Use). One component of what is meant is what is said: roug Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophyhly, the truth conditional content linguistically encoded in the utterance. The remainder - what is meant but not said - is what Grice calls implicatuCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy
re. Implicature itself subdivides into two major categories; conventional and conversational. Conventional implicature is content which is conventionaMandy SimonsCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy2000 Forbes Ave Pittsburgh PA 15217 USAphone: 412.268.5083 fax: 412.268.1440simonst&an Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophyure: implicatures that arise by virtue of general principles governing linguistic behavior. In "Logic and Conversation" (Grice 1975: henceforward. L&C) and “Further Notes on Logic and Conversation" (Grice 1978: hence, FN), Grice introduces the phenomenon of conversational implicature and lays out th Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophye principles which allow speakers to systematically mean more than they say.2.2.The Theory of Conversational ImplicatureTo account for the phenomenonCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy
of conversational implicature, Grice proposes that there are certain norms of conversational behavior, norms which are mutually known and typically adMandy SimonsCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy2000 Forbes Ave Pittsburgh PA 15217 USAphone: 412.268.5083 fax: 412.268.1440simonst&an Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophye in a conversation, render certain possible conversational contributions "unsuitable" (L&c 26). Grice summarizes the effect of these norms as a single overarching principle, which he calls the Cooperative Principle:Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophyoccurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.This principle has little force without further clarificatiCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy
on of what is in fact required of conversational contributions. Grice specifies this further in what he calls Maxims of Conversation, formulated as ruMandy SimonsCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy2000 Forbes Ave Pittsburgh PA 15217 USAphone: 412.268.5083 fax: 412.268.1440simonst&an Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophyage, these terms are used to designate the specific maxims Grice proposed. Grice himself, however, gives these specifically as categories of maxims "under one or another of which will fall certain more specific maxims and submaxims" (p.26), apparently envisaging the possibility of substantial lists Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophyof conversational rules. The maxims which Grice proposes are listed below, in some cases slightly reformulated from the original:Conversational MaximsCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy
QualitySupermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true1Do not say what you believe to be false.2Do not say that for which you lack adequateMandy SimonsCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy2000 Forbes Ave Pittsburgh PA 15217 USAphone: 412.268.5083 fax: 412.268.1440simonst&anMandy SimonsCarnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy2000 Forbes Ave Pittsburgh PA 15217 USAphone: 412.268.5083 fax: 412.268.1440simonst&anGọi ngay
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