Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
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Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
Patent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings patent behavior is critical. di congressional and regulatory agencies consider the impact of patent trolling on modern markets. Anecdotal evidence has suggested that ’non practicing entities,' also known as "patent trolls,' specifically target companies for lawsuits, licensing demands, or other mon Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringsetization activity as firms approach or complete major funding events, such as their initial public offering To test this narrative. we survey in-housPatent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
e legal staff at companies that have recently gone public about their exposure to patent demands surrounding their first round of venture capital fundPatent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringshe courtroom.Wc find evidence supporting extensive patent demand activity near IPOs, one of the most public and vulnerable periods of a company 's development. A significant proportion of recently public companies received paten! demands either shortly before or offer their IPO, with the majority of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings this activity originating from non-practicing entities. The effects are especially pronounced for information technology companies. Our results are yPatent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
et another indication that pttent assertion activity is driven by issues other than the merits of individual patent claims* Harry and Lillian HastingsPatent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringsstitute for I nnovation Law, university of California Hastings College of the Law. We wish to thank Abraham Cable, Lauren Cohen, Mark Lemley, Brian Love, Doug Melamed, Michael Risch, and participants at the is"' Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference for their comments on prior drafts of t Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringshis paper, and Dr. Carolyn Spencer for her comments on survey design and methodology. We are also grateful to Kristy Brady, Andrew Cordova, Kimberly FPatent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
ong, Sona Karakashian, Shaila Nathu, Saman Shooshani, Jake Wexler, Josh Wolf. Timothy Yim, Josh Young, and former uc Hastings librarians Peter GigantePatent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings........................................S3A.Background on the Extent of Modem Patent Monetization-------------------------55B.An Overview of Initial Public Offerings and Patent Monetization_______________6/c.Identification of Participants________________________________________________65D.Design of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-OfferingsStudy and Participants______________________________________________67E.Study Limitations_____________________________________________________________Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
68F.General Characteristics of Respondents 69II.Results.............................................................................................72Patent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings.The Impact of Patent Demands Against Recently Public Companies________________85III.CONCLUSIONS.......................2..............................................87IV.APPENDIX: Survey Instrument......................................................89I. IntroductionThis paper presents the results Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings of a survey conducted to study the topic of patent demands and how they affect recently public companies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that both compePatent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
titors and monetizers, colloquially known as "patent trolls/ may opportunistically time their patent demand activity to major funding events in a compPatent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringssue by surveying recently public companies about their exposure to parent demand activity surrounding two major funding events in a company’s development: the first round of venture capital funding and the completion of the initial public offering (IPO).After an exhaustive search process, over 550 U Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings.S. product companies were identified that issued IPOs between 2007 and 2012. The paper details responses from in-house staff, most often the generalPatent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
counsel, of over 50 of these product companies. The results provide quantitative information on the companies' exposure to patent demand activity at ePatent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringsperiod between officially declaring an intent to go public and issuing an IPO, and the year following the completion of the IPO. For each period, information is available about whether the company received patent demands, the number received, and the origin of the demands. Tile paper also includes r Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringsesults about exposure to patent demands depending on industry. In particular, we compared patterns of exposure faced by companies in information technPatent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
ology, the life sciences, and clean energy.Results also include subjective views of respondents. Specifically, company lawyers reported on whether patPatent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringsugh estimates of the costs their companies have54STANK>RD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 19:52incurred to prepare for or defend against patent demands. Finally, respondents had the opportunity to provide free-respon.se comments on the impact of patent demands on their companies and general comments abou Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringst the topic of patent demands.The results provide important observational data on strategic behavior in the market for patent monetization. In particuPatent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
lar, the results provide evidence of a tactical strategy among monelizers to pursue demands against companies during one of rhe most public and vulnerPatent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringson technology industry that went public.In contrast, we did not find systematic evidence that companies were targeted with patent demands near their early funding rounds after formation. For example, none of the information technology companies reported receiving patent demands in rhe periods immedi Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringsately before or after their first round of venture capital funding. In contrast, roughly 60% of information technology respondents reported receivingPatent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
patent demands in rhe periods around the company’s IPO. Similar but less dramatic patterns were observed for the small sets of life science and clean Patent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis of Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offeringshe first round of venture capital funding or in the year following the first round.•Nearly half of respondents reported patent demand activity in the period surrounding the IPO—either during the short period from the time of the public announcement to the actual IPO, or in the year following the IPO Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings.•Of the companies that received patent demands in the year following (he IPO, half said they received four or more patent demands during this period,Patent-Demands-and-Initial-Public-Offerings
and more than 80% said some of the activity against them originated from patent monetizers.Patent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis of Patent Demands and Initial Public OfferingsRobin Feldman* and Evan Frondorf**Cite as: 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 52 (2015)ABSTRACTQuunritarhv analysis ofGọi ngay
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