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advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

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Nội dung chi tiết: advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020y of Alfred Nobel 2020IMPROVEMENTS TO AUCTION THEORY AND INVENTIONS OF NEW AUCTION FORMATSThe Committee for the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory o

f Alfred NobelTHE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, founded in 1739. is an independent organisation whose overall objective IS to promote the science advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

s and strengthen their influence in society. The Academy takes special responsibility for the natural sciencesand mathematics, but endeavours to promo

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

te thee»change of ideas between various disciplinesBOX 50005 (LILLA FRESCATIVAGEN X Al. SE-104 05 STOCKHOLM. SWEDENTEL >Ắ4 e Ó73 95 oo. KVA3K7A.SE • W

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020ar back in history as we have written records. The Greek historian Herodotus documented auctions in ancient Babylon already 2500 years ago.1 In the Ro

man Empire, creditors regularly used auctions to sell off assets confiscated from delinquent debtors. In more modern times. Stockholms Auktionsverk. t advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

he oldest surviving auction house in the world was founded by the Swedish Baron Claes Rălamb in 1674. In addition to confiscated assets. Stockholms Au

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

ktionsverk auctioned a wide range of goods on behalf of willing sellers—for example. Sweden’s late 17,h century king. Karl XI. offered a batch of hunt

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020 total of £826 at their newly established auction company. That London-based company was to become Sotheby’s, presently the world's largest fine-arts

auction house.Setting their notorious history aside, auctions are certainly of far greater importance today than at any time in the past. Commodities advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

such as fish, fresh flowers, and rough diamonds are sold in auctions, as they have been for centuries. Financial securities—such as government bonds—

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

are frequently sold in modern versions of ancient auction designs. Governments have also come to rely on auctions for selling rights to timber, minera

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020tions have become ubiquitous. Platforms such as eBay rely on auctions to facilitate business-to-business. business-to-consumer. and consuiner-to-consu

mer transactions; search engines like Google and Yahoo! employ auctions to sell keyword positions and advertisements.Just as the increasing use of auc advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

tions has spurred auction research, auction research has spurred the increasing use of auctions. The resulting improvements to auction theory and inve

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

ntions of new auction formats have been truly collective efforts. But two scholars stand out: Paul R. Milgrom and Robert B. Wilson, both of Stanford U

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020uestions of fundamental theoretical importance—how bidders are likely to behave for a variety of auction formats and under different informational con

ditions—as well as questions of great practical importance, such as how regulators and governments should design auctions in order to maximize social advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

value. Moreover, insights from the Laureates’ work have directly shaped the design of important real-world markets. These insights do not just enable'

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

The Babylonian auctions were illustrated by the British artist Edwin Long in a famous I9'h century painting, which was sold to Thomas Holloway in a 18

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020.)2sellers 10 raise higher revenues or buyers to procure at lower costs. They also facilitate sales to the most appropriate buyer or procurement from

the most appropriate seller. In this way. auction theory can help regulators and governments around the world to put objects and activities into the h advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

ands of those agents who are best able to manage them.Auction theory thus provides another example of serendipity in science: every now and then, impo

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

rtant discoveries made in curiosity-driven basic research lead to unanticipated practical applications. In this case, the Laureates themselves produce

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020ation. When it comes to format, what are the rules for how prices are announced, how participants place bids, how prices are updated, how the auction

closes, and how "winners" are selected? For example, the English auction stipulates that open-outcry bids be given in ascending order until nobody sub advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

mits a higher bid. w ith the object allocated to the highest bidder at that price. And w ith regard to information, w hat do the participants know abo

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

ut the value of the auctioned object? In most cases, each bidder has some information that is not observable to others. The information may comprise b

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020 to other bidders (common-value components).Since participants generally have different goals and act strategically, the behavior of one bidder cannot

be understood in isolation from that of other bidders. Yet auctions are not zerosum games. On the contrary, the w hole point of an auction is to crea advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

te as much value as possible by assigning an object to the buyer who can make the best use of it. Hence, it was impossible to begin a rigorous analysi

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

s of auctions until non-cooperative game theory had been generalized beyond the special case of zero-sum games. That step w as taken in 1950 by John F

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020, in w hich each bidder has some private information, had to w ait for further extensions of Nash's theoretical framework by 1996 Laureate William s.

Vickrey and 1994 Laureate John c. Harsanyi.Vickrey (1961. 1962) provided a full-fledged analysis of different existing auction formats in his independ advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

ent private-values model. That is, each bidder's valuation of the object provides no information about other bidders’ valuations. While analytically u

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

seful, this information setting is rare in practice. In particular, for all objects w hose resale value is important, the independence assumption is i

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020sumption, specifically. Wilson (1969. 1977) characterized equilibrium bidding and prices in another special case, namely when the (ex-post) value of t

he object for sale is identical among all bidders, but bidders have different private information (ex-ante) about what that value will turn out to be. advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

In the case of objects such as mineral rights and financial assets, this common-values model approximates bidder objectives much better than the inde

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

pendent private-values model.However, most real-world auctions involve private-value as well as common-value components. Milgroin, w ho had been Wilso

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020(especially Milgrom. I98la.b: Milgrom and Weber. 1982) he advanced auction theory by studying a general case with both private and common values under

plausible, yet mathematically tractable, conditions for bidders’ information and the distribution of values across bidders. Milgroin's exhaustive ana advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

lysis modified, synthesized, and generalized many earlier results. Among other things, his findings showed when a seller can expect to raise higher re

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

venues by sharing expert appraisals—such as authenticity certificates or inspection protocols—with potential bidders. His extended analysis also made

©KƯNGLVETENSKAPSAKADEMIENTfC ROYAL SWEDISH ACACEMr or SCIENCES44116Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksb.mk Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020ction theorists had characterized equilibrium bidding in singleobject auctions under most, if not all. relevant auction formats and information settin

gs. Many predictions from the theory' of equilibrium bidding had also been supported by empirical work using both observational and experimental data. advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

Al this time, the main research focus shifted from single-object auctions to multi-object auctions. This shift was largely due to a desire to use mar

advanced-economicsciencesprize2020

kets for trading a wide range of objects—like spectrum-frequency bands, electricity, and batches of "troubled debt"—that had previously been allocated

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