N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
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N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativef G. w: F. Hegel: namely, that Hegel neglected to give sufficient weight to what Peirce calls “Secondness”, in a way that put his philosophical system out of touch with reality. The nature of this criticism is explored, together with its relevant philosophical background. It is argued that while the N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native issues Peirce raises go deep, nonetheless in some respects Hegel's position is closer to his own than he may have realised, whilst in others that criN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
ticism can be resisted by the Hegelian.Writing in a critical response to Hegel's Ladder, the magisterial study of the Phenomenology of Spirit by H. s.Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativeof reality that secondness provides. The commentary on each paragraph elaborates the text into an intricate web of philosophical and literary traditions. One acquires a rich sense of the polysemy of Hegel’s writings - how they are filled with the mediated, reflective structures of thought. There is N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativea lot of thirdness, to use Peirce’s term. As well, Harris, with his acute aesthetic sensibility, weaves this network of mediation into a whole which cN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
ollapses into a pervasive immediacy, into an intuitive apprehension of the total picture, or firstness. Missing are the brute facts of secondness whicPeirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativethe Phenomenology, Hegel’s primary focus is on this concrete content of consciousness’ experience and what it does to our confident pervasive assumptions, breaking them apart so that mediation is required.1In his reply to Burbidge, Harris defends himself by stating that “Hegel is ‘a philosopher of t N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativehirdness’”, so that he is right to approach the Phenomenology in the Correspondence Address: Robert Stern, Department of Philosophy, University of SheN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
ffield. Sheffield, S10 2TN, UK. Email: r.stern@sheffield.ac.uk2 way he does; but he also admits that “we philosophers of thirdness need ‘the dilemmas Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native Peircean terms is surprising in two respects. Firstly, it is surprising to see Peirce invoked in relation to Hegel at all, as the connection between the two has received hardly any critical attention? Secondly, it is curious to see Burbidge insisting that a reading of Hegel should offer “that healt N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativehy sense of reality that secondness provides”, when Peirce himself was critical of Hegel in just these terms, for neglecting Secondness within his phiN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
losophical system. And yet, as I hope to show in this paper, we can come to see that the question Burbidge raises has considerable interest; for the dPeirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativere familiar debates between Schelling and Hegel, Marx and Hegel, Derrida and Hegel, and many others. It is the issue highlighted by Burbidge, concerning the Peircean category of Secondness, that I wish to explore here.'As we shall see in what follows, Peirce held that a neglect for Secondness leads N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativeto a loss of “a healthy sense of reality” because of the role that Secondness plays within his categorical scheme, which also comprises the categoriesN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
of Firstness and Thirdness. As with any theory of categories, Peirce’s claim is that these are the fundamental conceptions that can be used to classiPeirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativeterms of the logical structure of thought, while by the late 1880s, he was showing how these categories where manifested in the world, tracing monadic, dyadic and triadic elements in the subject matter of biology, psychology, physics and so on. Most important, for our purposes, is his slightly later N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native phenomenological identification of the monadic, dyadic and triadic: put very briefly, Firstness is manifested in those aspects of things that concernN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
their immediacy or individuality, where they are seen in monadic terms, as unrelated to anything else; Secondness is manifested in the awareness of tPeirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativengs, as when the relation between individuals is said to be governed by laws or grounded in the universals they exemplify, and hence is a triadic notion. Fundamental to Peirce’s position is that philosophical errors follow if we3 attempt to prioritise one of these categories at the expense of the ot N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativeher two, although this is always a temptation?In particular, as far as Hegel is concerned, Peirce believed that he showed a lack of sensitivity to SecN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
ondness as the relational category, and thus neglected the relation of reaction and resistance that holds between things, including us and the world, Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativet as Burbidge complains of Harris’s commentary on Hegel - that he is “missing the brute facts of secondness which trigger thought’s mediation”, with the result that he is left (as critics from Schelling onwards have complained) with nothing but “arbitrary constructions of thought"? We must first loo N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativek at this criticism in more detail (in sections I to III), and then explore its cogency (sections IV and V).IPeirce’s criticism of Hegel concerning hiN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
s treatment of the categories, including Secondness, is made at its clearest in the paper “On Phenomenology”, which forms the text of Peirce’s second Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native the categories as “an element of phenomena of the first rank of generality”, by focusing on the nature and structure of our experience and how the world appears to us: “The business of phenomenology is to draw up a catalogue of categories and prove its sufficiency and freedom from redundancies, to N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativemake out the characteristics of each category, and to show the relations of each to the others”.7 Peirce says he will focus on the “universal order" oN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
f the categories, which form a “short list”, and notes the similarity between his list and Hegel’s, while denying any direct influence: “My intention Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativet] as being, roughly speaking, the correct list of Universal Categories.8 1 regard the fact that I reached the same result as he did by a process as unlike his as possible, at a time when my attitude toward him was rather one of contempt than of awe, and without being influenced by him in any discer N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativenible way however slightly, as4 being a not inconsiderable argument in favor of the correctness of the list. For if I am mistaken in thinking that myN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
thought was uninfluenced by his, it would seem to follow that that thought was of a quality which gave it a secret power, that would in itself argue pPeirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativeoes not introduce that terminology until the next lecture. Here, he offers a characterisation of the first two categories in phenomenological terms, beginning with Firstness, which he identifies with presentness because of its immediacy. Peirce then turns to Secondness, which because of its relation N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Nativeality he characterises in terms of “Strugg/e”, by which he means the resistance of the world to the self and vice versa, illustrating this with the exN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
amples of pushing against a door; being hit on the back of the head by a ladder someone is earning; and seeing a flash of lightning in pitch darkness.Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of SecondnessROBERT STERNUniversity of Sheffield, UKABSTRACT: This paper focuses on one ofc. s. Peirce’s criticisms of N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native strongly. Then, at the beginning of the next section of the text, Peirce comes to the category of Thirdness; but here we do not get any phenomenological analysis of the category, but an account of why “no modern writer of any stripe, unless if be some obscure student like myself, has ever done [it] N.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native anything approaching to justice”.11Now, Peirce offers a criticism of Hegel in relation to each of the three categories. Thus, in relation to FirstnesN.Scott_Momaday_s_House_Made_of_Dawn_as_a_Landmark_in_Native
s, Peirce argues that while Hegel recognized “presentness” or “immediacy”, he treated this as an “abstraction”, as if such presentness could not be aGọi ngay
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