Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript
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Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript
RECENT THEORETICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONKen CostelloSenior Institute EconomistThe National Regulatory Research I Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - TranscriptInstituteprepared forCentro de Estudios de la Actividad Regulatoria Energetica37497Revised September 2002iiTABLE OF CONTENTSPageSECTION1Restructuring of the U.S. Energy Industries................ 1Natural Gas........................................ 2Electricity..................................... Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript..... 6Comparison of the Two Energy Industries............. 122The Evolution of U.S. Regulation...........................153Challenges for RegulationQuestions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript
..................................19The Hybrid Model.....................................20Major Challenges....................................214DeveRECENT THEORETICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONKen CostelloSenior Institute EconomistThe National Regulatory Research I Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript..42iiiRESTRUCTURING OF THE U.S. ENERGY INDUSTRIESThe last several years have seem major restructuring reforms of the electricity and natural gas industries in both the U.S. and Argentina.1 This section will highlight the major features of the restructuring of the U.S. natural gas and electricity in Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcriptdustries. A later section will discuss the implications of the U.S. experience for regulators, since similarities exist in U.S. and Argentinean restruQuestions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript
cturing of their energy industries, some of these implications may be applicable to regulation in Argentina. Thus, this report contains topics that arRECENT THEORETICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONKen CostelloSenior Institute EconomistThe National Regulatory Research I Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcriptons in response to revised legislative objectives. These functions require the application of economic concepts and theories that previously were not in demand because of the highly monopolistic structure of the energy industries. The mixed competitive/monopoly environment within which energy utilit Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcripties in both the U.S. and Argentina currently operate poses new challenges for regulators in protecting consumers from market abuses and, to the extentQuestions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript
they have authority, in promoting competition in the restructured industries. This is no small task as regulators have found that achieving these duaRECENT THEORETICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONKen CostelloSenior Institute EconomistThe National Regulatory Research I Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcriptonsidered pertinent.1Worldwide, energy-industry restructuring has had sonic common features and outcomes: (1) convergence OÍ views on the need for limited government intervention in markets, (2) reforms are more likely to occur when conditions deteriorated sufficiently (more true for less developed Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcriptcountries) so that there emerged a political imperative for better industry performance, (3) refoims become more difficult when rhe total redistributiQuestions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript
on effect generated by reform is giearei relative to its aggregate efficiency benefits, (4) reforms become more sustainable when they generate “winnerRECENT THEORETICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONKen CostelloSenior Institute EconomistThe National Regulatory Research I Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript for the electricity industry in particular, reform has been plagued by lent-seekers heing given a chance to diminish overall the benefits of restructuring by tainting plans, (6) economists and other analysts have increasingly believed that good economic advice on industry restructuring requires und Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcripterstanding of die political economy of the situation, and (7) the need, for political purposes, to have in place adequate social proteclion or a safetQuestions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript
y net when reforms hurt some stakeholders.1Natural GasIn the U.S., energy industry restructured began in 1979 with the passage of the Natural Gas PoliRECENT THEORETICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONKen CostelloSenior Institute EconomistThe National Regulatory Research I Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript comprehensively regulated from the wellhead market to the retail market. Serious gas supply curtailments induced largely by wellhead price controls provided the political motivation for the deregulation of the wellhead sector. The pressure from an open wellhead market ultimately led to major reform Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcripts by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that swung open new markets for gas producers through non-discriminatory access of interstate pipQuestions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript
elines. FERC Order 436/500 in particular represented a milestone in the further advancement in restructuring of the U.S. natural gas industry. This orRECENT THEORETICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONKen CostelloSenior Institute EconomistThe National Regulatory Research I Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcriptetition in the U.S. natural gas industry. In addition, several states have extended competition to the retail market through legislation and regulatory rules that allow residential and commercial customers the ability to purchase their gas from alternative suppliers.2Two factors explain much of the Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcriptmotivation behind restructuring of the U.S. natural gas industry. First, the malfunctioning of the wellhead market attributable to federal price contrQuestions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript
ols created severe gas shortages in cold-weather states. Second, institutional barriers foreclosed the delivery of deregulated wellhead gas. which at RECENT THEORETICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONKen CostelloSenior Institute EconomistThe National Regulatory Research I Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcriptlosses to consumers from these regulation-induced deficiencies provided a strong political push for industry reforms.The U.S. natural gas industry has taken on a new look over the last twenty years. Prior to the enactment of the Natural Gas Policy in 1978, the industry was comprehensively regulated Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcriptfrom the wellhead to the burner tip. Federal regulation of the industry originated in 1938 with the signing into law of the Natural Gas Act. This2See,Questions to the Mayor - Appendix 2 - Transcript
for example. Kenneth w. Costello and Mohammad Harunuzzaman, Consumer Benefits from Gas Choice: Empirical Findings from the First Programs (Columbus, RECENT THEORETICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONKen CostelloSenior Institute EconomistThe National Regulatory Research IRECENT THEORETICAL AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN ENERGY PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATIONKen CostelloSenior Institute EconomistThe National Regulatory Research IGọi ngay
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