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RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

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Nội dung chi tiết: RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-AcquaintanceKenneth WillifordIn this study I argue for the following claims: First, it's best to

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject- think ol subjective character as the self-acquaintance ol each instance of consciousness—its acquaintance with itself. Second, this entails that all

instances of consciousness have some intrinsic property in virtue of which they, and not other things, bear this acquaintance relation to themselves. RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

And. third, this is still compatible with physicalism as long as we accept something like ill re structural universals: consciousness is a real, multi

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

ply instantiable, natural universal or form, but it likely has a highly complex, articulated structure, and “lives'' only in its instances. In order t

Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-AcquaintanceKenneth WillifordIn this study I argue for the following claims: First, it's best to

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-some sense (or involves a subject object polarity), as well as the competing and Humean tntu ition that one of the supposed relata. the subject-relatu

m. is not phenomenologically accessible. By identifying the subject with the episode or stream of consciousness itself and maintaining that consciousn RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

ess is immediately self-aware (“reflexively" aware), these competing intuitions can be reconciled. I also argue that it is a serious confusion to iden

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

tify subjective character with one's individual ity or particularity.I argue that deeper reflection on the fact that consciousness has only incomplete

Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-AcquaintanceKenneth WillifordIn this study I argue for the following claims: First, it's best to

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-ms of physicalism that they might seem to be In particular, I briefly consider the Crain Problem and the apparent primitive simplicity of the acquaint

ance relation itself in this light.KeywordsAcquaintance I Consciousness I Direct realism I Tirst-order representationalism I For me ness I Harder prob RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

lem I Heidelberg school Higher order representation alism I Individuality Individuation Intrinsic property Mineness I Naturalize I Particularity Pheno

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

menal consciousness I Phenomenal intentionality I Physical-ism I Qualitative character Reflexive awareness I Reflexivity I Relational property I Repre

Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-AcquaintanceKenneth WillifordIn this study I argue for the following claims: First, it's best to

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-ory Stream of consciousness I Structural universals I Subject I Sub jective character I The grain problem Transparency intuitionAuthorKenneth Willifor

dwilliford@uta.eduThe University of TexasArlington, TX, U.SACommentatorTobias Sclilicht tobias.schlicht@rub deRuhr UniversitãtBochum. GermanyEditorsTh RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

omas Metzinger metzinqer@uni mainz.deJohannes Gutenberg-UniversitatMainz. GermanyJennifer M, VVindtJennifer, windt @ monash.eduMonash UniversityMelbou

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

rne. Australia1 Introduction111 this study. I argue for the following claims: First, it’s best, to think of subjective character as the self-acquainta

Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-AcquaintanceKenneth WillifordIn this study I argue for the following claims: First, it's best to

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-ot bold that persons uniHt be the “subject relata” of acquaintance relations. Rather, 1 hold that epteodflB of coi»scioii«ie»s are, fmi-darncntidly. t

lx- subject retain.Second, this does indeed entail that all instances of consciousness have some internal relational property (or intrinsic property) RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

in virtue of which they, and not other things, bear this acquaintance relation to themselves. Anti, third, this is still compatible with physicalism a

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

s long as we accept something like in re structural universals. There is always a price, but in this caseWilliford. K. (2015). Reprc-ventationalisms.

Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-AcquaintanceKenneth WillifordIn this study I argue for the following claims: First, it's best to

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-5700541 I 27it’s arguably no more than the price we pay to be scientific realists.'To make these cases, 1 must consider some important preliminaries.

1 give a characterization of subjective character that accounts for the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is relational in some sense (or involv RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

es a subjectobject polarity), as well as the competing Humean intuition that one of the supposed re-lata, the subject-relatum, is not phenomenological

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

ly accessible. If the latter is true, it is hard to explain how we could have immediate evidence (as opposed to some sort of inferential knowledge) of

Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-AcquaintanceKenneth WillifordIn this study I argue for the following claims: First, it's best to

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-f (however we individuate or ontologize these)1 and maintain that consciousness is immediately self-aware (“reflexively” aware1), then the intuition o

f relationality and the Humean intuition of the missing subject can be reconciled.1 also argue that it is a serious confusion to identify subjective c RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

haracter with one's individuality or particularity. This will be considered first from a phenomenological point of view, in relation to our tendency t

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

o describe subjective character in terms of ownership or “mineness”, and then from an ontological point of view, in relation to the metaphysical indiv

Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-AcquaintanceKenneth WillifordIn this study I argue for the following claims: First, it's best to

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-lf-knowledge will allow US to see that certain problems afflicting acquaintance theories, like the one I defend, are not the threats to certain forms

of physicalism that they might seem to2 This Is not to iiujtly that scientific realism entails phpõcalistn, of course..3 This is a difficult write I w RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

ill not enter into. Ser c.g.. Dainton (2ÍMXI. 2008): StrawM.n (21X19).4I will occasionally use the terms “reflexivity" and “reflexive awareness" to de

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

note Just this characteristic of consciousness (i.e., that of its always being aware of itself). It is not to he confused with "reflection" in the sen

Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-AcquaintanceKenneth WillifordIn this study I argue for the following claims: First, it's best to

RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-ain of conscious states, according to the view accepted here (ns well as being antisymmetric). But not everything that stands in this relation is self

-acquainted episodes of consciousness are. but they are also acquainted with sensory qualities, and these latter are not acquainted with anything. RepresentationalismsSubjectiveCharacterandSelfAcquaintance-ExplainingSubjectiveCharacterRepresentationReflexivityorIntegration-IndividuationIntegrationandthePhenomenologicalSubject-

Representationalisms, Subjective Character, and Self-AcquaintanceKenneth WillifordIn this study I argue for the following claims: First, it's best to

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