The Interactivist Model
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The Interactivist Model
The Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Modelprocess enables an integrated account of the emergence of normative phenomena. I show how substance assumptions block genuine ontological emergence, especially the emergence of normativity, and how a process framework permits a thermodynamic-based account of normative emergence. The focus is on two The Interactivist Modelfoundational forms of normativity, that of normative function and of representation as emergent in a particular kind of function. This process model oThe Interactivist Model
f representation, called interactivism, compels changes in many related domains. The discussion ends with brief attention to three domains in which chThe Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Modelty, Hume, Kim. normative function, representation. Millikan. Dretske, Fodor, Cummins, perception, learning, evolutionary epistemology, language, social ontologyThe interactivist model of representation and cognition is an action and interaction based approach — it is roughly Pragmatic in that sense. The Interactivist Model It involves fundamentally different assumptions about representation than those made in standard models in the literature, and. more deeply, a fundamThe Interactivist Model
entally different metaphysical framework from the substance, structure, and particle frameworks that are still dominant in most of philosophy, cognitiThe Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Modelarrow, primarily cognitive, focus, but the interaction and process assumptions involved in that early narrower model differed significantly from dominant assumptions in related domains. Consequently, it proved impossible to integrate the early model with theories in those related domains2with which The Interactivist Modelit had to interface — e.g.. as an account of interactive representation must interface with an account of language.It became necessary to either abandThe Interactivist Model
on the original model, or to extend it into interrelated domains. This scenario of overcoming incompatible modeling assumptions by extending the core The Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Modelnd with respect to deeper and deeper levels of theoretical and metaphysical assumptions involved. Over the course of some years of such growth, it has become a skeletally systematic philosophy and theory, addressing multiple phenomena and layers of metaphysical assumptions across a wide range of top The Interactivist Modelics. I will focus here primarily on normative biological function, representation, and cognitive issues.The discussion proceeds in three parts: 1) anThe Interactivist Model
outline of an underlying metaphysical stance within which the remainder of the article is developed, 2) a model of the emergence of normativity, in thThe Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Modelge.1. Metaphysics: Process versus SubstanceThe heritage of the Greeks includes some fundamentally aporetic metaphysical positions that still dominate contemporary thought. Among other consequences, phenomena such as the emergence of normativity are rendered conceptually impossible. Before turning to The Interactivist Model some more recent manifestations. I briefly look at the origins of this conceptual tradition.Against Heraclitean flux. Parmenides argued that change iThe Interactivist Model
s not even possible: For A to change into B would require that A disappear into nothingness and B emerge out of nothingness. Nothingness cannot exist,The Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Modelin to pointing to that something (Campbell. R. J.. 1992). Because nothingness cannot be pointed to. it cannot exist, and. therefore.3cannot participate in change. Change, therefore, cannot occur. This is an early example of the difficulties that nothingness and falsity have posed throughout Western The Interactivist Modelthought: consider, for example, the difficulties that recent thinkers from Russell to Fodor have had with the possibility of representing something thThe Interactivist Model
at does not exist, or with false representation.Certainly the Greeks look these problems seriously, and attempted to provide solutions or dissolutionsThe Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Model substances did not change, thus satisfying the Pannenidcan constraint against nothingness and emergence. Within this framework, the appearance of change and differences could be accounted for in terms of varying mixtures of the substances and changes in those mixtures (Guthrie, 1965; Wright. 1997). The Interactivist Model Similarly. Democritus proposed non-divisible Pannenidean wholes — atoms — which did not change, but that apparent change could be accounted for in teThe Interactivist Model
rms of various and changing configurations of such atoms (Guthrie, 1965; Taylor. 1997). Aristotle’s version of the four elements of earth, air. fire, The Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Modelre remained an unchanging, therefore Parmenides-satisfying. base of prime matter (Gill. 1989).1The acceptance of such a metaphysical ground of unchangingness, be it substance or particle, has strong and potentially problematic consequences:1 The word substance is used both for substance as stuff and The Interactivist Model for substance as entity or particular thing. Substance as particular thing is especially common in traditions derived from translations of Aristotle.The Interactivist Model
In such frameworks. stuff is generally referred to as ‘matter’. I am using -substance’ to refer to some kind of stuff an unchanging substratum out ofThe Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Model9), having to do with the unity that makes an object or entity different from an aggregate. do not have the same font! in a process framework. Such issues do. however, at least partly overlap with issues of process stability, with which I will be centrally concerned.Substance as particular thing is The Interactivist Modelthe most common usage in ontology, but substance as stuff is also found te.g.. Butchvarov. 1999: Belsey. 1995: Graham. 1997.2096; Guthrie. 1965: RealeThe Interactivist Model
. 1987: Trusted. 1999). Substance as stuff is more common in scientific usage — e.g., gold or water as substances (Robinson, 2004). rhe confusion and The Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Modelr than as "substance” (e.g.. Campbell, 1992; Owens, 1978).41The explanatory default is lack of change — inertness — and change requires explanation.2Emergence is impossible. Empedoclean substances can mix, but there is no way for a fifth substance to emerge.3The metaphysical realm of substances or p The Interactivist Modelarticles and their properties and interrelations, characterized in terms of cause and fact, is split off from the realm of mental kinds of phenomena,The Interactivist Model
properties, and interrelations — of intentionality, normativity, and modality.Within a metaphysical framework that incorporates this split between subThe Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Modeld accounts of the world attempted in terms of the two realms. Aristotle’s matter and form. Descartes’ two kinds of substances. Kant’s two realms of noumena and phenomena, and early analytic philosophy’s diremption between the factual world of science and that of social and linguistic normativity, ar The Interactivist Modele all examples.Another possibility would be to attempt to account for the world in terms of just the “mental” realm, yielding an idealism like that ofThe Interactivist Model
Hegel, Green, or Bradley. Or one might try to explain it in terms of just the “substance” or material realm alone, like Hobbes, Hume (on many interprThe Interactivist ModelMark H. Bickhardmark@bickhard.namehttp:.7www.bickhard.ws/AbstractA shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of p The Interactivist Modelwo realms via some sort of emergence of one out of the other, but emergence is precisely one of the concepmal possibilities that the substance particle metaphysics was intended to preclude.1 21 Clearly, this would have to be some kind of ontological emergence. An epistemologically basedemergence wou The Interactivist Modelld simply leave all of the metaphysical issues untouched.51.1 HumeGọi ngay
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