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Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

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Nội dung chi tiết: Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 s. This is certainly true in English football where, since the early 1980s, shirt and kit sponsorships have generated important revenues for clubs at

all levels. Companies increasingly view sponsorships as an effective way to promote their corporate and/or product brands. This chapter presents a cas Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

e study of SEGA Europe’s use of a football shirt sponsorship in the launch of its new video gaming console and brand (the Dreamcast) in the UK market,

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

rhe sponsorship sought to capitalize on the popularity ol football among the prime market segment for its product and to benefit from television and

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 developments. It was prepared using secondary sources and interviews with key informants in football organizations, sports marketing firms, and footba

ll researchers.1IntroductionSEGA Enterprises, a Tokyo-based video game company, launched its new Drcamcast console in the Japanese market on November Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

27, 1998. North American and European introductions were planned for September 1999. SEGA expected that the Dreamcast console would challenge Sony’s P

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

layStation for market leadership. Management ar SEGA’s European subsidiary was considering football shirt sponsorships as one clement in its launch an

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 eo gamers. In addition, television was broadcasting more and more football games - often on a panEuropean basis - providing valuable exposure for comp

anies and their brands. Therefore, football seemed ideally suited to communicating with those most167sport and Corporate Nationalismsinterested in buy Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

ing the Dreamcast. This was particularly the case in the UK, where football was a national passion and video gaining was also a favorite pastime. Cons

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

equently, in late 1998 SEGA Europe management was giving active consideration to partnering with a top English football club. There was about a six-mo

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 r a decision to be made.Londons Arsenal EC was a logical football club for SEGA to consider as a sponsorship partner. Arsenal has had a long and rich

history. Founded as the Royal Arsenal EC in Woolwich, Kent, in 1886, the club moved to its present location at Highbury in North London in 1913 (Soar Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

and Tyler, 1989). It is one of a handlul of English football teams that is well known and supported around the world and in the last decade, after Man

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

chester United, has had the single best record of English clubs. In December 1998, it was announced that Japanese electronics giant JVC would end its

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 000 season, which kicked-off in late August.1 he case study that follows examines SEGA and Arsenal in turn. The industry environment of each organizat

ion is described, then the shirt sponsorship factors are outlined, followed by details of the shirt sponsorship deal that was struck, as well as subse Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

quent developments. A number of final comments bring the chapter to a close.The Video Gaming IndustryIn the late 1990s, three Japanese companies fough

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

t for dominance of the global video game industry. Despite its late entrance, Sony was the market leader. Nintendo and SEGA had at various times occup

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 an late in 1998, and North American and European introductions were planned for September 1999. Nintendo was rumored to be launching a new product. As

a result, both companies expected to gain substantial ground on Sony and its extremely successful PlayStation. However, Sony itself would be launchin Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

g a new product the PlayStation 2 — in 2000. Product and game technology, market timing, and marketing flair were all critical to company success in t

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

his industry.HistoryThe video game industry starred in the 1980s and has gone through several cycles of boom and bust, with shakeouts of marginal comp

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 much faster and more sophisticated games. A period of depressed sales occurred in the early 1990s when PC technology played leapfrog and drew users aw

ay from video game companies. In late 1994, video gaming broke back when Sony introduced its innovative PlayStation. This development changed rhe indu Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

stry dramatically. The quality of images and sounds made possible by the technology meant that the industry was seen as selling something more than a

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

toy. For the first time, large numbers of adult users were attracted to video gaming. Nintendo launched the N64 in 1997 in an attempt to regain some g

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 echnology, rhe games industry is substantial. By the end of 1999, it was forecast that the installed base would number more than 100 million Sony Play

Stations, Nintendo N64s, and SEGA Saturns and Drcamcasts globally. Household penetration levels were high and the value of industry sales (consoles an Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

d games) was about US$20 billion in 1999 (.1'12.2 billion)2 - larger than Hollywood box-office revenues for the first time (Business, 1999).SUGA Compe

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

titorsSony was the competitor to beat, dominating almost everywhere with market shares in the 60 percent to 70 percent range, rhe PlayStation had prov

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 provided 16 percent ol Sony’s sales and 44 percent of profits (Fulford, 1999). However, after four years of booming PlayStation sales, volumes were do

wn (Sony warns, 1999). Sony was planning to introduce its PlayStation 2 to the Japanese market in time for Christmas 1999. Early reports suggested the Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

new console would be a formidable competitor. Technically, the console would be able to outperform PCs and workstations and would be “backwards compa

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

tible” - old game libraries would not be made obsolete by the console. This was a benefit for users, software producers and resellers alike.Nintendo w

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 ystem (NF.S) dominated the second-generation of consoles. Nintendo also pioneered hand-held games and still leads that market with the GameBoy. Its su

ccess with the NES made it slow to develop a successor and rhe sixreen-bit Super NES (and later N64) failed to meet profit expectations. Although it h Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

ad not publicly announced plans for a successor to the N64, Nintendo was rumoured to be working on a console to be launched in Japan in time for the i

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

mportant Christmas 2000 holiday.169sport and Corporate NationalismsConvergence in entertainmentVideo gaming was fast becoming a “mainstream activity,”

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 ayStation, consoles sold across a wider age range (eight to twenty-nine years), with the average owner being seventeen years old (Littlewood, 1999). T

he broadening in rhe appeal of video gaming meant that close parallels existed between the prime market segments for gaming products and football.Give Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

n the size and continued growth prospects, it was rumoured that Microsoft had designs on rhe US$15 billion (£9.1 billion) global video-game market. An

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

other factor was the advanced graphics capabilities ol the new consoles, which were seen as challenging the future of PC-gaming and, more broadly, int

9SEGA Dreamcast: National Football Cultures and the NewEuropeanismPhilip RossonCommercial sponsorships have become an important element in most sports

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2 g, 1999).SLGA and the DreamcastSEGA had seen its share ol world markets slide dramatically since 1992. Its sixteen-bit MegaDrive console, launched in

1989 as the Genesis in North America, was the dominant third-generation gaming machine. However, SEGA was unable to make the transition to the next ge Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

neration of player (using CD-ROM disks). The Saturn console, launched the same year as Sony’s PlayStation, never met corporate objectives (Schofield,

Sport and corporate nationalisms part 2

1999). Consequently, SEGA’s share had gone from about 50 percent in the early 1990s to stand at little more than 1 percent in rhe US market in 1998. I

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