cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
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cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - papers, vulnerable nuclear warning and command - control- communications (C3) systems, and advanced technology for cyberwar will complicate future efforts in nuclear crisis management. New technology for waging conflict in the cyber domain is only part of the problem. The principal danger for nuclear-str cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paperategic stability lies in the interactions between instruments for cyberwar and the sinews of nuclear decision making. During the Cold War and the firscyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
t nuclear age, expectations about crisis management and deterrence stability were based on relatively static models of nuclear exchanges and "black bo0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paperanizations) matters as much, or more, than hardware. States' efforts to approach the brink without crossing the nuclear threshold will depend upon their ability to fulfill the objective requirements for successful crisis management, as discussed herein, despite a new matrix of embedded uncertainties cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper created by the information age.2IntroductionThe full implications of combining the worst weapons of mass destruction with advanced weapons for cyberwcyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
ar are still obscure. The nuclear revolution that dominated the Cold War took place in an environment of relative information scarcity and primitive i0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - papern nuclear crisis management. For the United States and Russia, the nuclear-cyber relationship has special significance: the two powers hold more than 90 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons; both have advanced offensive and defensive cyberwar capabilities; and both Washington and Moscow have expe cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paperrienced the stress of nuclear crisis management under Cold War and later conditions.1 The implications of the nuclear-cyber nexus are explored below icyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
n two steps.2 First we^Grateful acknowledgment is made to Paul Davis. Andrew Putter, Lawrence Korb. Gabi Siboni and Timothy Thomas lor insights into t0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper. New York: Henry Holt - limes Books, 2012.2 For insights on this topic, see Erik Garlzke and Jon R. Lindsay, "Thermonuclear cybcrwar, Journal of Cybersecurity (2017), pp. 1-12,cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
lso: Putter, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New3consider important conceptual issues emerging from the overlap of nuclear and cyber. Second, we tu0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paperial overlap between concepts or practices for cyberwar and for nuclear deterrence?3 Cyberwar and nuclear weapons seem worlds apart. Cyber weapons should appeal to those who prefer a non-nuclear, or even a post-nuclear, military-technical arc of development. War in the digital domain offers, at least cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper in theory, a possible means of crippling or disabling enemy assetsQuestions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy (London: Royal United Sendcyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
ee Institute for Defence and Security Studies, RƯSI Occasional Paper, July 2016), www.nisi.org: and Fuller, "War Gaines Redux? Cyberthreats, U.S.-Russ0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper62839.2015.ỈH2276,3In this study we use the terms information warfare and cyber war generically, although some cyber grammarians might insist that “cyber” war be restricted to digital attacks on information systems and networks per se. and information warfare to broader kinds of influence operations cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper, possibly including digital and-or other methods. For sensible approaches to these issues, see: Martin C. Libicki, “The Convei^ence of Information Wacyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
rfare," Strategic Studies Quarterly, no. 1 (Spring 2017), pp. 49-65; p.w. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs t0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - papertary (Chicago, 111.: Ivan R. Dee, 2008), Ch. 6-7; and Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND. 2009).4without the need for kinetic attack, or while minimizing physical destruction.4 Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are the very epitome of "mass" destruction, such that th cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - papereir use for deterrence, or the avoidance of war by the manipulation of risk, is preferred to the actual firing of same. Unfortunately, neither nuclearcyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
deterrence nor cyber war will be able to live in distinct policy universes for the near or distant future.Nuclear weapons, whether held back for dete0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paperance (C4ISR). The weapons and their C4ISR systems must be protected from attacks both kinetic and digital in nature. In addition, the decision makers who have to manage nuclear forces during a crisis should ideally have the best possible information about the status of their own nuclear and cyber fo cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paperrces and command“For example, see David E. Sanger. Julian E. Barnes and Nicole Perlroth, “Preparing for Retaliation Against Russia,U.S. Confronts Hackcyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
ing by China,” JVew York Tunes, March 7, 2021, https://www.nvtimes.com/2021/03/07/us/politics,'microsoft-solarwinds-hack-russia-china.html. On the inf0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paperon, D.c. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019, www.dia.mil: Timothy L. Thomas, Cyber Silhouettes: Shadows Over Information Operations (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2005), esp. Ch. 5-6, 10, 14 and passim. See also: Thomas, Russia: Military Strategy - Impacting 2T Centur cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - papery Reform and Geopolitics (Ft. Leavenworth. Kansas: Foreign Military' Studies office, 2015). pp. 253-299 for a discussion of Russian cyber capabilitiescyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
and doctrines, and Pavel Koshkin, “Are cyberwars between major powers possible? A group of Russian cybersecurity experts debate the likelihood of a c0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper 2013, davidjohnson@starpower.net.5systems, about the forces and C4ISR of possible attackers, and about the probable intentions and risk-acceptance of possible opponents. In short, the task of managing a nuclear crisis demands clear thinking and good information. But the employment of cyber weapons cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paperin the early stages of a crisis could impede clear assessment by creating confusion in networks and the action channels that are dependent on those necyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
tworks.5 The temptation for early cyber preemption might "succeed" to the point at which nuclear crisis management becomes weaker instead of stronger.0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paperntial launch decision would depend. Farther down the chain of command, cyberattack could degrade the launch-readiness of strategic forces, especially the silo-based Minuteman missiles. It appears far more remote but not impossible that cyberattack could even produce unauthorized launches of these un cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper-recallable missiles, which are poised to fire instantly or with a short preprogrammed time delay after receiving a short stream of computer code. Thecyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paper
missiles do not care who sends them the code, only that it is correct.6’ Cyber weapons are not necessarily easy to use effectively as enabling instru0Why the Next "Cuban Missile Crisis" Might Not End Well:Cyberwar and Nuclear Crisis ManagementStephen J. Cimbala©1AbstractSpeeded up offensive threats cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - papere: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. Ch. 4-5.0 Bruce G. Blair, “Loose cannons: The president and US nuclear posture," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, V. 1 (2020). pp. 14-26, citation p. 19, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1701279 cyber war crisis management - 3-29-21 - paperGọi ngay
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