Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
➤ Gửi thông báo lỗi ⚠️ Báo cáo tài liệu vi phạmNội dung chi tiết: Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
To appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidencehitfield (eds.) Social Epistemology: An Anthology, also from Oxford.Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence1Thomas Kelly Princeton University1. IntroductionMy aim in this paper is to develop and defend a novel answer to a question that has recently generated a considerable amount of controversy. Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence The question concerns the normative significance of peer disagreement. Suppose that you and I have been exposed to the same evidence and arguments thPeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
at bear on some proposition: (here is no relevant consideration which is available to you but not to me, or vice versa. For the sake of concreteness, To appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidencese, has just rested its case.You and I are weather forecasters attempting to determine whether it will rain tomorrow. We both have access to the same meteorological data.You and I are professional philosophers interested in the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism. Each of US Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence is thoroughly acquainted with all of the extant arguments, thought experiments, and intuition pumps that the literature has to offer.‘This paper is sPeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
omething of a sequel to Kelly (2005). While in many respects it is faithful to the position advanced there, it depans in others; significant departureTo appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order EvidenceUniversity and at the University of California at Irvine; I am grateful to the audiences present on those occasions. In addition. I would like to thank Aaron Bronfman. David Christensen. Adam Elga, Hartry Field. Allan Gibbard, Margaret Gilbert, Daniel Greco, Aaron James, Jim Joyce, Sarah McGrath, Ph Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidenceilip Pettit, Jim Pryor, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Roy Sorensen, and Ernest Sosa for helpful conversations on the topic.2Suppose further that neither oPeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
f US has any particular reason to think that he or she enjoys some advantage over the other when it comes to assessing considerations of the relevant To appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidenceut who is more reliable— evidence afforded, perhaps, by a comparison of our past track records—such evidence suggests that we are more or less equally reliable when it comes to making judgments about the domain in question? Nevertheless, despite being peers in these respects, you and 1 arrive at dif Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidenceferent views about the question on the basis of our common evidence. For example, perhaps I find myself quite confident that the accused is guilty, orPeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
that it will rain tomorrow, or that free will and determinism are compatible, while you find yourself equally confident of the opposite. Question: onTo appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence) should we revise our original views?Some philosophers hold that in such circumstances, you and 1 are rationally required to split the difference. According to this line of thought, it would be unreasonable for either of US to simply retain his or her original opinion. Indeed, given the relevant sy Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidencemmetries, each of US should give equal weight to his or her opinion and to the opinion of the other in arriving at a revised view. Thus, given that IPeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
am confident that the accused is guilty while you are equally confident that he is not, both of US should retreat to a stale of agnosticism in which wTo appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidenceeer and to one’s own opinion.Recently, The Equal Weight View has been endorsed by a number of philosophers. Here, for example, is Richard Feldman:[CJonsider those cases in which the reasonable thing to think is that another person.Of course, the kind of uncontroversial ‘track record’ evidence that b Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidenceears most directly on questions of comparative reliability will be much easier to come by in some domains than in others. (In this respect, contrast rPeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
eliability in accurately forecasting the weather and reliability in accurately answering metaphysical questions.)3every bit as sensible, serious, and To appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidenceuation acknowledges its symmetry....in those cases. 1 think, the skeptic al conclusion is the reasonable one: it is not the case that both points ol view are reasonable, and it is not the case that one’s own point of view is somehow privileged. Rather, suspension of judgement is called for (2006, p. Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence235).’It is no surprise that The F.qual Weight View has lound sophisticated advocates; it is in many respects an appealing view. Indeed, reflection onPeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
certain kinds of cases can make it seem almost trivial or obviously tine. Consider, for example, cases involving conflicting perceptual judgments sucTo appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidenceace is extremely close. At time to.just as the first horses cross the finish line, it looks to me as though Horse A has won the race in virtue of finishing slightly ahead of Horse B; on the other hand, it looks to you as though Horse B has won in virtue of finishing slightly ahead of Horse A. At tim Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidencee 1. an instant later, we discover that we disagree about which horse has won the race. How. if at all, should we revise our original judgments on thePeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
basis of this new information?Many find it obvious that, in such circumstances, 1 should abandon my original view that Horse A won the race and you sTo appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidenced become agnostics about which horse won the race until further evidence becomes available. This, OÍ course, is exactly what The Fqual Weight View enjoins. But one might expect that what holds for perceptual judgments holds also lor judgments of other kinds, anil thus, in general.’Compare Feldman (2 Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence003), which, alter reviewing a number of examples of the kind al issue here, draws the conclusion that ‘In the situations most plausibly thought Io bePeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
cases of reasonable disagreement, suspension of judgment is the reasonable attitude to take toward the disputed proposition’ (p. 189).The F.qual WeigTo appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidencepathy for a policy of ‘splining the difference’ throughout his own discussion of the topic. Although the view that I will put forth differs from theirs, I have learned much from each of these authors.4Further evidence for The Equal Weight View seems to be afforded by certain natural analogies involv Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidenceing inanimate measuring devices. Consider for exampleCase 2. You and I are each attempting to determine the current temperature by consulting our ownPeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
personal thermometers. In the past, the two thermometers have been equally reliable. At time to. I consult my thermometer, find that it reads ‘68 degrTo appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidencey lake up that belief. At time tl, you and I compare notes and discover that our thermometers have disagreed. How, if at all, should we revise our original opinions about the temperature in the light of this new information?4I take it as obvious that in these circumstances I should abandon my belief Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence that it is 68 degrees and you should abandon your belief that it is 72 degrees. In particular, it would be unreasonable for me to retain my originalPeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
belief simply because this was what my thermometer indicated. Indeed, inasmuch as the relevant evidence available to US is exhausted by the readings oTo appear in Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.) Disagreement, forthcoming from Oxford University Press, as well as in Alvin Goldman and Dennis Wh Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidencehese circumstances, we should treat the conflicting thermometer readings as equally strong pieces of evidence. But—one might naturally conclude-what holds for the conflicting readings of equally reliable thermometers holds also for the conflicting judgments of individuals who are peers in the releva Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidencent respects. The mere fact that I originally judged that the accused is guilty is no reason for me to retain that view once I learn that you originallPeer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence
y judged that he is innocent. Just as I should retreat to a state of agnosticism about whether the temperature is 68 or 72 degrees once I learn what yGọi ngay
Chat zalo
Facebook