Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pills
➤ Gửi thông báo lỗi ⚠️ Báo cáo tài liệu vi phạmNội dung chi tiết: Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pills
Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pills
Scholarship RepositoryUniversity of Minnesota Law SchoolArticlesFaculty Scholarship2005Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison PillsBr Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pillsrett McDonnellUniversity of Minnesota Law School, bhm@umn.eduFollow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articlesỜ“ Part of the Law CommonsRecommended CitationBrett McDonnell. Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills. 3 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 205 (20 Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pills05), available at https //scholarship, law umn.edu/faculty_articles/116.This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of MShareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pills
innesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship ReposiScholarship RepositoryUniversity of Minnesota Law SchoolArticlesFaculty Scholarship2005Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison PillsBr Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pillsareholder bylaws that limit or direct board action raise tough and fascinating questions of both statutory interpretation under state law and an important policy matter. In particular, over the last decade shareholders have sought to use bylaws to limit poison pills and to grant shareholders access Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pillsto the corporate proxy materials to nominate directors. This paper argues that an expansive, although not unlimited, shareholder power to enact bylawsShareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pills
is both a plausible interpretation of Delaware’s statutory scheme and desirable as a policy matter. Shareholder bylaws that set general rules of corpScholarship RepositoryUniversity of Minnesota Law SchoolArticlesFaculty Scholarship2005Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison PillsBr Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pillsson pill and proxy access bylaws, both are valid under the general analysis, although poison pill bylaws may not be valid due to a more specific provision of Delaware law. The SEC should require boards to include bylaw proposals unless the particular proposal is clearly invalid under relevant state Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pillslaw.Table of ContentsI.Introduction........................................................207II.Background...........................................Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pills
..............209A.Poison Pill Bylaws..........................................209B.Shareholder Nomination Bylaws...............................211IIIScholarship RepositoryUniversity of Minnesota Law SchoolArticlesFaculty Scholarship2005Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison PillsBr Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pillsstory and Judicial Interpretations............227IV.Policy Analysis of Bylaws..........................................235A.ArgumentsAssuming Shareholder Primacy....................237B.ArgumentsAssuming a Stakeholder Approach.................248t Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law Sch Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pillsool. I would like to thank Stephen Bainbridge, Lynne Dallas, David McGowan, Frank Partnoy, Paul Rubin, Bill Wang, and participants at the University oShareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pills
f Minnesota Law School’s Half-Baked Ideas Club, a panel at the Law and Society Association’s annual meeting, and faculty colloquia at the University oScholarship RepositoryUniversity of Minnesota Law SchoolArticlesFaculty Scholarship2005Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison PillsBr Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pillsthe University of Minnesota Law School provided helpful research assistance.Berkeley Business Law JournalVOL J.l, ZUUJc.Statutory Interpretation Revisited............................251V.The SEC and Shareholder Proposals...................................252A.Proposalsthat Are Improper Under State L Shareholder Bylaws Shareholder Nominations and Poison Pillsaw.................253B.Proposalsthat Relate to Ordinary Business Operations.......258c.Proposalsthat Relate to an Election.260Scholarship RepositoryUniversity of Minnesota Law SchoolArticlesFaculty Scholarship2005Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison PillsBrScholarship RepositoryUniversity of Minnesota Law SchoolArticlesFaculty Scholarship2005Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison PillsBrGọi ngay
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