The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
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The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gamerew University of Jerusalem Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory and the Department of PsychologyBiographical note: The author received his PI1.D. in social psychology from The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and has recently finished a one year post-doctoral visit to The Department The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game of Management and Policy at The University of Arizona.https://khothuvien.cori!AbstractHebrew University of Jerusalem students participated in two expThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
eriments of repeated play of the Intergroup Prisoners' Dilemma (1PD) game, which involves conflict of interests between two groups and, simultaneouslyThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gameir group’s effort in the conflict). Consistent with the hypothesis that participants use strategies of reciprocal cooperation between groups, higher levels of out-group competition caused participants to increase their contribution and lower levels caused them to decrease it. In addition, participan The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gamets had accurate recall of the contribution levels of out-group members, and they attributed motivations to out-group members in a manner that reflecteThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
d their level of contribution. The nature of reciprocation with the out-group is discussed in light of both behavioral and cognitive data.Key words: IThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gameern individual behavior in intergroup conflicts? The answer to this question depends to a large extent on how the conflict is conceptualized. Social scientists have often modeled intergroup conflict as a two-person game (Allison, 1971; Axelrod. 1984; Brams, 1975; Snidal, 1986), necessarily assuming The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gamethat the interest of the individual is identical to that of his group. Thus, if it is rational for the group to compete it must also be rational for tThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
he individual group member to do so. Other researchers recognized that what is best for the group is not necessarily best for the individual group memThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gamence “Group-level territoriality has always required that the soldier abandon for extensive periods of time the protecting of his own wife, children and home” (p. 24).The conflict between individual interest and group interest referred to by Campbell (1972) is a problem of public goods provision (Rap The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gameoport and Bornstein, 1987; Bornstein, 1992). It stems from two facts. First, the payoffs associated with the outcomes of inter-group conflicts (e.g.,The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
territory, political influence, higher wages) are equally available to all the members of a group, regardless of their contribution to the group’s effThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) games typically too costly (in terms of money, time, effort or risk taking) to be justified on a rational basis. Therefore, self-interested rational group members are expected to free ride on the contribution of others. Of course, if everyone else free ride as well, the group would lose the competition The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gameand the public goods.3To capture the intra-group and inter-group levels of conflict, Bornstein (1992) devised the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
Game. The game as operationalized in the present study involved a competition between two teams with three players in each team. Each player received The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gameas paid to each player according to following scheme: if all players in Team A contributed, while no players in Team B contributed, each player in A received a bonus of 6 points and each players in B received 0 points. If there were 2 more contributors in Team A than in Team B. each player in A rece The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gameived 5 points and each player in B received one point. If there was one more contributor in Team A than in Team B, each player in A received 4 points,The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
whereas each player in B received 2. Finally, in case of an equal number of contributors in both teams, each player in both Teams received a 3-point The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game his decision to contribute (C) or not to contribute (NC), the number of ingroup contributors (mA) and the number of out-group contributors (mB). appears in Figure 1.The payoff parameters of the IPD game were such that: First, withholding contribution was the dominant individual strategy; that is, r The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gameegardless of what the ingroup and out-group members did, the individual earned an extra point by not contributing. Second, the dominant strategy for eThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
ach team was to have all of its members contribute, regardless of what the out-group did. In the present experiment, each team player earned 1 more poThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gameontribution than if they all contributed. When no one contributed (a40:0 tie) each player earned 5 points whereas if all contributed (a 3:3 tie), each player earned only 3 points. No-contribution was, in fact, the collectively (i.e., Pareto) efficient outcome of the game, the one which maximize the The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gameearnings of all six participants.Figure 1. Payoff to a member in team A as a function of the decision to contribute (C) or not to contribute (NC), theThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
number of in-group contributors (mA) and the number of out-group contributors (mB).The first and second properties of the IPD game define the intra-gThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game contribute, the structure of the intra-group dilemma remains constant regardless of the number of out-group contributors.2 As can be seen in Figure 1, in all four intra-group PD games (corresponding to 0,1, 2 and 3 out-group contributors in the 1PD game) the cost of contribution for the individual The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gameand the benefit (i.e., externality) it produces for the team are the same.5Therefore, if one assumes that individual behavior is motivated solely by sThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
elf-interest - the assumption of narrow rationality - one should expect no contribution in the one-shot 1PD game, irrespective of the out-group’s behaThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gametion, regardless of what the out-group does. Of course, in reality, participants are likely to be concerned with both self-interest and common group interest to various degrees. Nonetheless, any fixed combination of self-interest and group interest should lead to a constant contribution rate, irresp The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gameective of the number of out-group contributors.What if participants are predisposed to maximize the relative difference in payoffs between the in-grouThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
p and the out-group? The assumption that people are motivated to achieve positive self esteem by making the in-group positively distinct from the out-The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gamen numerous laboratory experiments using the minimal group paradigm (for reviews see Brewer, 1979; Diehl, 1990; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Tajfel, 1982). However, in the IPD game individual behavior, even if governed by a motivation to maximize the groups’ payoff difference, should not be affected by th The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gamee behavior of out-group members. This is so, because in the IPD, individual contribution increases the ingroup’s payoff by 3 points and reduces the ouThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game
t-group’s payoffs by 3 points, regardless of the out-group behavior. Therefore, no matter what the out-group does, individuals who wish to maximize thThe effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in theIntergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game1Harel GorenThe Hebr The effect of out-group competition on individual behavior and out-group perception in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) gamehavior in the one-shot IPD only to extent that they are motivated to “win” or at least not “lose” the6Gọi ngay
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