The Evolution of Cooperation
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The Evolution of Cooperation
The Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of Cooperation261Abstract:The study of the emergence of cooperation in anarchy has neglected to address the implications of multiple issues linked within a hierarchical structure. In many social situations, actors simultaneously (or sequentially) interact in several issue areas. For example, countries typically i The Evolution of Cooperationnteract with their neighbors on both security issues and economic issues. In this situation, there is a hierarchy among the issues in that the costs aThe Evolution of Cooperation
nd benefits in one issue (war) surpass the costs and benefits in the other issue area (trade). This article explores the impact of multiple, hierarchiThe Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of Cooperationm the analysis. First, while altering the payoffs in only one issue area has a marginal impact on overall cooperation, sustaining high levels of cooperation across the population requires improving incentives to cooperate in both issue areas. Second, cooperation can be sustained even when the payoff The Evolution of Cooperations are based on relative power. Third, the rate of learning is critical for the emergence and spread of cooperative strategies.David L. Rousseau AssistThe Evolution of Cooperation
ant ProfessorDepartment of Political Science 235 Stiteler HallUniversity of Pennsylvania Philadelphia. PA 19104 E-mail: rousseau@sas.upenn.edu Phone:(The Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of CooperationniaPhiladelphia. PA 19104 E-mail: m.xcantor@sas.upenn.edu1INTRODUCTIONSince Axelrod’s (1984) landmark study, we have learned a lot about the evolution of cooperation and the utility of agent-based computer simulations to explore the evolutionary process.1 One issue (hat has been neglected in this gr The Evolution of Cooperationowing literature is the impact of multiple issue areas on the emergence of cooperation. In many social situations, actors simultaneously (or sequentiaThe Evolution of Cooperation
lly) interact in several issue areas. For example, countries typically interact with their neighbors on both security Issues and economic issues. In tThe Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of Cooperation area (trade). This article explores the impact of multiple, hierarchically structured issue areas on the level of cooperation in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game using a computer simulation. Three findings emerge from (he analysis. First, while altering the payoffs in only one issue area has a m The Evolution of Cooperationarginal impact on overall cooperation, sustaining high levels of cooperation across the population requires Improving incentives to cooperate in bothThe Evolution of Cooperation
Issue areas. Second, cooperation can be sustained even when the payoffs are based on relative power. Third, the rate of learning is critical for the eThe Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of Cooperationons of multiple issue areas in international relations. Over the last several centuries the sovereign state has emerged as the dominant organizational unit in the international system (Spruyt 1994). During this evolutionary period, sovereign states and their competitors have struggled to identify an The Evolution of Cooperation optimal strategy for maximizing economic growth and prosperity. In general, states have pursued some combination of three general strategies: (1) warThe Evolution of Cooperation
, (2) trade, or (3) isolation. For example, realists such as Machiavelli (1950) argued that military force Is an effective instrument for extracting wThe Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of Cooperationaximizing economic efficiency and national wealth. Finally, economic nationalists such as Hamilton (Earle 1986) rejected this liberal hypothesis and argued that isolation from the leading2trading states rather than integration with (hem would enhance economic development. The three policies are not The Evolution of Cooperationmutually exclusive. For example, List promoted both military expansion and economic isolation for Germany in (he 19lh century (Earle 1986). However, iThe Evolution of Cooperation
n general, trade and war are viewed as hierarchical because stales rarely trade with enemies during military conílic I. While some instances have beenThe Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of Cooperationeau 2004).The importanc e of issue linkage has long been rec ogni/ed. Axelrod and Keohane (1906, 239) argued that issue linkage could be used Io alter incentive structures by inc Teasing rewards or punishments. Although this idea of issue linkage has been explored with rational choice models (e.g.. The Evolution of CooperationMorgan 1990; Lacy and Niou 2004) and case studies (e.g., Oye 1986), modeling issue linkage as a two-stage game within an N-person setting has largelyThe Evolution of Cooperation
been neglected.1Conceptualizing trade and war as generic two stage game raises a number of interesting questions that will be explored in this articleThe Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of Cooperatione amount of cooperation in the international system? What factors encouraged (or discouraged) the rise of a cooperative order? What strategies might evolve to facilitate the maximization of state wealth in a two issue world? f inally, how stable are systems characterized by hierarchical linkages?COO The Evolution of CooperationPERATION IN ANARCHYMany interactions among states arc structured as ‘‘Prisoner's Dilemmas" due to Older of preferences and the anarchical environmentThe Evolution of Cooperation
of the international system, rhe Prisoner's Dilemma is a non-zero-sum game in which an actor has two choices: cooperate (C) with die other or defect (The Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of Cooperationff "T”); 2) we both cooperate (CC. or the Reward Payoff "R "); 3) we both defect (DD or the Punishment Payoff "P"); and 4) I cooperate and you defect (CD or the Sucker's Payoff "S"). The preference order coupled with the3https://khothuvien.cori!symmetrical structure of the game implies that defectio The Evolution of Cooperationn is a dominant strategy for both players in a single play game because defecting always yields a higher payoff regardless of the strategy selected byThe Evolution of Cooperation
the opponent. Therefore, the equilibrium or expected outcome for the single play prisoner’s dilemma game is “defect-defect" (i.e., no cooperation). TThe Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of Cooperation actor has an incentive to unilaterally alter their selected strategy' because they fear exploitation.2Many situations in international economic and security affairs have been models as iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas. In the trade arena, researcher tend to assume states liave the following preference The Evolution of Cooperationorder from “best” to “worst”: 1) I raise my trade barriers and you keep yours low; 2) we both keep our trade barriers low; 3) we both raise our tradeThe Evolution of Cooperation
barriers; and 4) I keep my trade barriers low and you keep yours high. In the security sphere, scholars typically assume that states possess the folloThe Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of Cooperationsions; and 4) 1 make security concessions but you do not. While scholars have identified particular Instances In which preference orders may deviate from these norms (e.g., Conybeare 1986 and Martin 1992), the Prisoner's Dilemma preference order is typical of many, if not most, dyadic Interactions i The Evolution of Cooperationn the two issue areas.4Students of game theory have long known that iteration offers a possible solution to the dilemma (Axelrod 1984, 12). If two ageThe Evolution of Cooperation
nts can establish a cooperative relationship, the sum of a series of small "Reward Payoffs" (CC) can be larger than a single "Temptation Payoff" folloThe Evolution of Cooperation in a Hierarchically Structured, Two-Issue Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: An Agent-Based Simulation of Trade and War382 The Evolution of Cooperationor and punishments for non-cooperative behavior -- / will only cooperate if you cooperate. The strategy of Tit-For-Tat nicely captures the idea of conditional cooperation. A player using a Tit-For-Tat strategy' cooperates on the first move and reciprocates on all subsequent. Axelrod (1984) argues th The Evolution of Cooperationat the strategy' is superior to4https://khothuvien.cori!others because it is nice (l.e., cooperates on first move allowing a cc relationship to emergeThe Evolution of Cooperation
), firm (i.e., punishes the agent's opponent for defecting), forgiving (i.e., if a defector returns to cooperation, the actor will reciprocate), and cGọi ngay
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