The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

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The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

The Economics of Shame: Values, Price and Sanctions inPublic Goods ProvisionA thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, f

The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provisionfor the degree of D.Phil.Shepley w. OrrBalliol CollegeTrinity Term, 2008The Economics of Shame: Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods ProvisionS

hepley w. OrrDepartment of Sociology and Balliol College, University of OxfordTrinity Term, 2008AbstractThe thesis is an attempt to develop a rational The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

choice theory of social sanctions. More specifically, the thesis is a theoretical (in Part I) and empirical-experimental (in Part II) enquiry into th

The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

e optimal balance between informal and formal institutional approaches to solving the problem of cooperation. In chapter 1 I take a “negative” approac

The Economics of Shame: Values, Price and Sanctions inPublic Goods ProvisionA thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, f

The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provisionl choice framework, Coleman’s Foundations of Social Theory and Hechter’s Principles of Group Solidarity. 1 criticize these models for failing to expla

in either the motivations to comply when sanctioned, or the motivations of those who sanction. Chapter 2 argues that because an agent may recognize th The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

eir own ability to act on their own best interests, subject to constraints on the level of social sanctions received, an agent may rationally rely on

The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

other people to help them enforce the agent’s own aims. In an appendix to the thesis I provide a philosophical critique of one influential rational ch

The Economics of Shame: Values, Price and Sanctions inPublic Goods ProvisionA thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, f

The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provisions. I use motivational crowding theory' to argue that because the social rewards for cooperation that may develop through work are potentially based in

a desire for pecuniary gain, withholding approval may matter less to initially cooperative agents. Hence, mutual monitoring can decrease cooperation The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

in teamsPart II of the thesis attempts to subject some of the theoretical claims in part I to empirical, laboratory test. In chapter 4 I operationaliz

The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

e the notion of different motivational types using the scale of social value orientations, a trust scale, and a measure of cooperative reasoning. I fi

The Economics of Shame: Values, Price and Sanctions inPublic Goods ProvisionA thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, f

The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provisionlic goods design along with an opportunity for punishment at the end of each contribution round, such that after contributing (or not), each individua

l is given feedback on other group members’ contributions, and is allowed to assign monetary punishment points to them. The prediction, therefore, is The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

that cooperative types will contribute and punish less than individualists in the condition where there is a costly punishment mechanism. This predict

The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

ion is largely-borne out in the results of the experiment.iiTable of ContentsAcknowledgementsVIIntroduction: Social Sanctions and CooperationVIIIPART

The Economics of Shame: Values, Price and Sanctions inPublic Goods ProvisionA thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, f

The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision as a Selective Incentive and a CollectiveGood: a Motivational Crowding Critique21Approval Incentives in Sociological Models of Collective Action....2

2Social Approval as a Collective Good: Hechter on Intentional Goods.93Social Approval as a Selective Incentive: Coleman on the Emergence of Norms204Co The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

nclusion...............................................................34Chapter 2: Shame and Self-Control: Resolving Coleman’s ParadoxAND Defining Se

The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

lf-Conscious Emotions371Introduction: Coleman’s Paradox and Weakness of Will..............372Defining Shame: Feeling Ashamed and Shaming Others.......

The Economics of Shame: Values, Price and Sanctions inPublic Goods ProvisionA thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, f

The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provisionts..70Chapter 3: The Economics of Shame in Work Groups: How MutualMonitoring can Decrease Cooperation in Teams731Introduction: Social Pressure Through

Monitoring in Agency Theory........732Social Rewards and Sanctions in Work Groups: Previous Economic Models....773Social Relationships as Supportive The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

or Controlling External Intervention..82

The Economics of Shame: Values, Price and Sanctions inPublic Goods ProvisionA thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, f