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The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speech

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The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speech

Vanderbilt Law ReviewVolume 631 Issue 5Article 340452The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy and SpeechNeil M Richardshollow this and additional works at: htt

The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speechtps://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlrPart of the Privacy Law CommonsRecommended CitationNeil M. Richards The Puzzle of Branded, Privacy, and Speech

, 63 IWnWf Laie RCI’ICH' 1295 (2019)Available at: https://schoUrship,law,vanderbiltedu/vlr,'vol63/iMi$/3This Article Is brought to you for free and op The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speech

en access by Scholarship^ Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted foe Inclusion In Vander blit Law Review by an aưtboriatd editor of Scholanlup^Vanderbih

The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speech

Law tw more mformxion. pleaw COTtart mark.) will>uTn(4^andertxltedv.Common Agency and the Public Corporation_________________________________________

Vanderbilt Law ReviewVolume 631 Issue 5Article 340452The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy and SpeechNeil M Richardshollow this and additional works at: htt

The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speechmanager-agents by empowered shareholder-principals will reduce agency costs created by management shirking and expropriation of private benefits. But

while shareholder power may result in reduced managerial expropriation, an analysis of how that power is often exercised in public corporation governa The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speech

nce reveals that it can also produce significant costs: influential shareholders may extract private benefits from the corporation, incur and impose l

The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speech

obbying expenses, and pressure corporations to adopt inapt corporate governance structures. These costs strain the simple principal-agent model on whi

Vanderbilt Law ReviewVolume 631 Issue 5Article 340452The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy and SpeechNeil M Richardshollow this and additional works at: htt

The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speeched when multiple principals influence a single agent; in the case of a corporation, common agency describes a shareholder / management relationship in

which multiple shareholders with competing preferences exert influence on corporate management. The common agency theory set out in this Article prov The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speech

ides several important contributions to the literature on corporate governance and shareholder empowerment. First, the theory provides a more complete

The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speech

explanation of the motivations for and outcomes of shareholder activism, including the activities of governmental owners, large institutional investo

Vanderbilt Law ReviewVolume 631 Issue 5Article 340452The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy and SpeechNeil M Richardshollow this and additional works at: htt

The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speechng on these findings, the theory suggests possible regulatory changes to ensure that the benefits of shareholder activism outweigh its costs.**♦Common

Agency and the Public CorporationPaul Rose'INTRODUCTION...........................................1356I.Common Agency Theory and Its Application toPu The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speech

blic Corporations..............................1361A. Evidence of Common Agency in PublicCorporations.............................. 13651.Shareholder

The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speech

Influence in PublicCorporations.........................13652.Heterogeneity of Interests AmongPublic Company Shareholders......... 1370a.Heterogeneity

Vanderbilt Law ReviewVolume 631 Issue 5Article 340452The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy and SpeechNeil M Richardshollow this and additional works at: htt

The Puzzle of Brandeis Privacy and Speech............. 1377II.Governance Implications of Common Agency.........1380

Vanderbilt Law ReviewVolume 631 Issue 5Article 340452The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy and SpeechNeil M Richardshollow this and additional works at: htt

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