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1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013eshiva University Cardozo Ans & Entenainment Law Journal 13 Cardozo Arts& Ent LJ 475* B.A. 1955, University of Chicago; J.D. 1979, Yale Law School; Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, U.S.A. ' J.H. Reichman, 1995. The author gratefully acknowledges the thoughtful advice and sugge phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013stions that Professors Wendy Gordon, Marci Hamilton, Pamela Samuelson, and Paul Geller have kindly provided.TEXT:1*4751IntroductionGovernments adopt iphy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
ntellectual property laws in the belief that a privileged, monopolistic domain operating on the margins of the free-market economy promotes long-term 1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013 known human needs in more or less standardized ways cannot escape the price-setting function of the competitive market. In contrast, intellectual goods acquire value by deviating from standard solutions to known human needs in ways that yield more efficient outcomes or that capture the public's fan phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013cy. Because intellectual goods define relevant market segments in terms of the novelty or the originality they purvey, their creators invent their ownphy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
markets by stimulating demand for goods that did not previously exist. n2By the end of the twentieth century, the role of intellectual property right1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013otiations. n3 The Final Act embodying the results of that Round incorporates an Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS" Agreement) into the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). n4 The universal minimum standards (*477| of protecti phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013on set out in the TRIPS Agreement tend to detach intellectual property rights from their historical roots in territorial law and to align them more clphy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
osely with general norms of public and private international law applicable to older, more tangible forms of property. n5In so doing, however, the dra1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013ghts to the status of universal norms. n6 On the contrary, they deliberately built upon the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary' and Artistic Works (1886), n7 as progressively developed 118 and 1*478| supplemented phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013by other international agreements. n9 These "Great Conventions," as they are known, established a worldwide constitutional framework that directly orphy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
indirectly configures the various domestic2systems on which it rests, nio Their nineteenth-century conceptual underpinnings remain central to the oper1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013of studies nil that questions the [*479] capability of this inherited institutional framework to meet the needs of creators, innovators and investors operating under the changed conditions of an Information Age. 1112 It re-examines certain negative economic premises underlying the patent and copyrig phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013ht paradigms and explains how these premises are tacitly implemented in a compartmentalized, bipolar framework that supports the international intellephy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
ctual property system as historically conceived. The Article then suggests that a proliferation of hybrid legal regimes falling outside this classical1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013te. Once these hybrid or deviant regimes are taken into account, the real structure of the international intellectual property system as it empirically operates at the end of the twentieth century differs radically from the bipolar structure embodied in the Great Conventions at the end of the ninete phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013enth century.The Article concludes with the thought that efforts to balance the public and private interests at stake in devising legal incentives forphy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
twenty-first-centuiy innovation are likely to produce cycles of under- and overprotection until the economic implications of existing hybrid legal re1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013hile, the discrepancies between the nineteenthcentury historical construct and the twentieth-century empirical realities charted in this Article suggest that the TRIPS Agreement could yield fewer beneficial results than anticipated and. in some areas, could even compound the social disutilities stem phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013ming from an obsolete and increasingly dysfunctional institutional framework. nl4 The Article ends by reaffirming the need for a new intellectual propphy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
erty paradigm nl5 specifically devised for the conditions that induce legislators everywhere to enact hybrid regimes that deviate from the legal and e1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013l Property SystemThe term "intellectual property" was not coined until the late nineteenth century. Only when Josef Kohler and Edmond Picard perceived that copyright, patent, and trademark laws had more in common with each other than with the older forms of property known to Roman law was it recogni phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013zed that a new class of rights in intangible creations had arisen. nl6 Their use of the term "intellectual property" thus coincided with the drive forphy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
international regulation of both artistic and industrial property, a movement destined to produce a fully articulated and universally recognized lega1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013Conventions purport to subdivide the international intellectual property system into two hermetically sealed compartments separated by a common line of demarcation. Literary and artistic property rights occupy one of these compartments; so-called industrial property rights occupy the other. nl831. T phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013he Patent and Copyright SubsystemsThe origins of the bipolar structure can lie traced to cornerstone provisions of the Great Conventions extant sincephy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
their inception and to corresponding stale prac tices recognized by most [*481] developed intellectual property systems. On die one hand. Article 1 of1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013zed at length in Article 2(1), should receive automatic and mandatory protection in the domestic copyright laws OÍ the member sidles. n20 To avoid censorship and to liberate authors from oven and coven forms of patronage. 1121 tiicsc laws entitle almost all independently created works falling within phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013 the designated subject manor catcgotics to a generous but relatively soil iorm of protec lion dgainsl copying only thdt lasts d long period of time.phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
n22On the other hand, Articles 1(1) and 1(2) of the Paris Convention established "a Union for the protection of industrial property" n23 and identifie1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013vice marks, trade names, indications of source ... and the repression of unfair competition." 1124 While some international minimum standards and the rule of national treatment apply to all these institutions. n25 the Paris Convention entrusted the protection of industrial creations primarily to "th phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013e various kinds of industrial patents recognized by the laws of 1*4821 the countries of the Union." 1126 The patent paradigm and variants thereof clasphy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
sically confer a tougher form of protection on strict formal and substantive conditions for a relatively short period of time. n272. The Historical Li1CHARTING THE COLLAPSE OF THE PATENT-COPYRIGHT DICHOTOMY: PREMISES FOR A RESTRUCTURED INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMJ.H. Reichman *1993 Ye phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013 the Paris and Berne Conventions becomes of paramount importance. A line that appears unclear or poorly defended will tempt entrepreneurs to circumvent the strict prerequisites of patent law, with its basic requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness, in order to shelter industrial creation phy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013s within the more receptive and generous embrace of copylight law. which applies without regard to artistic merit. 1128 An unclear line of demarcationphy-peh1516-apx1-BSc-modules-from-2013
also leads to the risk that the same subject matter will attract different proprietary regimes. This, in turn, renders classical intellectual propertGọi ngay
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